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IMMUTABILITY AND INNATENESS ARGUMENTS ABOUT 
LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL RIGHTS 
EDWARD STEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
A popular and intuitively plausible argument for the rights of lesbians, 
gay men and bisexuals (LGB people1) focuses on the claim that sexual 
orientations are inborn and/or unchangeable. This argument draws on three 
sources: ethical, scientific, and legal. The scientific source is the widely 
held observation that people generally (and LGB people particularly) do 
not choose their sexual orientation. This observation is buttressed by claims 
about the causes and character of human sexuality. The ethical source is the 
general intuition that people should not be punished for something that they 
did not choose. Together, these ethical and scientific beliefs lead to the 
conclusion that LGB people should not be subject to discrimination, their 
sexual behaviors should not be criminalized, they should have the option 
for their relationships to be publicly sanctioned, and, more generally, they 
should not be treated differently from heterosexuals. Simply put, if a person 
is "born gay" or if his or her sexual orientation was not a choice, it is wrong 
to punish or discriminate against a person for this reason. The legal princi-
ple underlying this argument for LGB rights is the so-called immutability 
factor in equal protection jurisprudence.2 The idea is that this factor plays a 
significant role in justifying the legal protections afforded race and sex 
classifications and courts are especially protective of discrimination on the 
basis of race and sex because people do not chose these traits. The argu-
• Vice Dean, Professor of Law, and Director of the Gertrud Mainzer Family Law, Policy, and Bioethics 
Program, Cardozo School of Law. The author thanks Holning Lau for his invitation to write this article 
and his helpful comments on an earlier version as well as the editors and other staff of this Journal for 
their assistance at various stages of the writing and editing process. 
I. I do not in this article generally address the broader group of sexual minorities that includes 
transgender people. The arguments I consider herein focus specifically on sexual orientation rather than 
gender identity, so I will generally use the LGB acronym. While I am fully supportive of transgender 
rights and see arguments for the rights of transgender people as central to LGBT rights generally, this 
paper does not consider arguments for transgender rights. When I am talking about sexual minorities 
generally, rather than just LGB people, I will use the LGBT acronym so as to signal the inclusion of 
transgender people. 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 65-69 and Part IV. 
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ment for LGB rights draws an analogy between these classifications and 
sexual orientations. 
Arguments based on the immutability and innateness of sexual orien-
tation have been around for about a one hundred and fifty years. 3 In the 
1860's, Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, a German jurist and scholar, offered a theo-
ry of how same-sex sexual desires developed. He thought a person's sexual 
instinct resided in his or her soul and that lesbians and gay men (who he 
termed uringins and urings, respectively) were suffering from "hermaphro-
ditism of the soul." Ulrichs used his theory to argue vociferously and sin-
gle-handedly-and, as it turns out, quixotically-for the repeal of all laws 
criminalizing same-sex sexual activity.4 Today, versions of this general 
"argument from etiology" for LGB rights-what I call the "born that way" 
and "not a choice" arguments-are so popular that dissent from the idea 
that LGB people's sexual orientations are innate and immutable is, in many 
contexts, treated as tantamount to opposing LGB rights. 
Consider two examples. First, on August 9, 2007, an LGB cable tele-
vision network held a "town hall" event for Democratic presidential candi-
dates. Pop singer Melissa Etheridge, one of the panelists for the event, 
asked New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, at the time a candidate for 
the Democratic presidential nomination, the following question: "Do you 
think homosexuality is a choice, or is it biological?"5 Richardson began his 
reply by saying, "It's a choice."6 After the debate, Richardson was lam-
basted for his answer and he immediately tried to explain away what he 
said. 7 Among the excuses Richardson offered were: that he had flown all 
night to get to the event; that he thought Etheridge was asking him "a tricky 
science question"; and that he uses the word "choice" so much because he 
is "so committed to ... a women's right to choose" that he thought 
"choice" was the appropriate answer.8 Despite Richardson's otherwise pro-
3. SIMON LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE: THE USE AND ABUSE OF RESEARCH INTO HOMOSEXUALITY 
39-58 (1996). 
4. HUBERT KENNEDY, ULRICHS: THE LIFE AND WORKS OF KARL HEINRICH ULRICHS, PIONEER 
OF THE MODERN GAY MOVEMENT 45-46, 89 ( 1988). 
5. Governor Bill Richardson, New Mexico, "Visible Vote '08" Presidential Candidates Forum 
Sponsored by the Human Rights Campaign and the Logo Network (Aug. 9, 2007) in FEDERAL NEWS 
SERVICE (transcript also on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review). 
6. Id. 
7. See Andrew Belonsky, Richardson 's Gay Choice, QUEERTY (Aug. 10, 2007), 
http://www.queerty.com/ news/richardsons-gay-choice-20070810; Richardson Asks to Speak with 
Advocate to Clarify His Positions, THE ADVOCATE (Aug. II, 2007), 
http://www.advocate.com/news/2007/08/11/richardson-asks-speak-with¾C2%AO-advocate-clarify-his-
positions. 
8. See Belonsky, supra note 7. 
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gay political statements before and during the debate, his comment that 
sexual orientations were chosen was seen as homophobic. 
Second, and more recently, actress Cynthia Nixon, widely-known for 
her role as Miranda in the television show Sex in the City, gave an inter-
view in The New York Times Magazine, which was reported as follows: 
"I gave a speech recently, an empowerment speech to a gay audience. 
and it included the line 'I've been straight and I've been gay, and gay is 
better.' And they tried to get me to change it. because they said it implies 
that homosexuality can be a choice. And for me. it is a choice. I under-
stand that for many people it's not. but for me it's a choice, and you 
don't get to define my gayness for me. A certain section of our commu-
nity is verv concerned that it not be seen as a choice. because if it's a 
choice, then we could opt out. I say it doesn't matter if we flew here or 
we swam here. it matters that we are here and we are one group and let 
us stop trving to make a litmus test for who is considered gay and who is 
not." INixon'sl face was red and her arms were waving. "As you can 
tell," she said, "I am verv annoyed about this issue. Why can't it be a 
choice? Why is that any less legitimate? It seems we're just ceding this 
point to bigots who are demanding it, and I don't think that they should 
define the terms of the debate. I also feel like people think I was walking 
around in a cloud and didn't realize I was gay, which I find really offen-
sive. I find it offensive to me, but I also find it offensive to all the men 
I've been out with. "9 
The gay community's reaction was described as "outrage."IO One gay 
rights activist described Nixon's comments as "irresponsible and flippant," 
suggesting she was unintentionally fueling abuse of gay children. 11 A gay 
blogger criticized Nixon for "sloppy language[] and thinking" that "did 
some real damage to [LGBT] civil rights."12 Within a week, Nixon released 
the following clarifying statement: 
"My recent comments in The New York Times were about me and my 
personal story of being gay. I believe we all have different ways we 
came to the gay community and we can't and shouldn't be pigeon-holed 
into one cultural narrative which can be uninclusive and disempowering. 
However, to the extent that anyone wishes to interpret my words in a 
strictly legal context I would like to clarify: While I don't often use the 
9. Alex Witchel,LifeAfter 'Sex', N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 22, 2012, at 27. 
I 0. Lucas Grindley, Cynthia Nixon: Being Bisexual "Is Not a Choice, " THE ADVOCATE (Jan. 30, 
2012,), http://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2012/0 I /30/cynthia-nixon-being-bisexual-not-
choice. 
11 . Lisa Leff, Actress ' Claim to be Gay by Choice Riles Activists, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 27, 2012, 
6: 17 PM) http://news.yahoo.com/actress-claim-gay-choice-riles-activists-201717513.htrnl (quoting and 
paraphrasing Wayne Bessen, founder of Truth Wins Out, an organization that monitors attempts to 
change the sexual orientation of children, and author of WAYNER. BESSEN, ANYTHING BUT STRAIGHT: 
UNMASKING THE SCANDALS AND LIES BEHIND THE EX-GAY MYTH (2003)). 
12. John Aravosis, Actress Cynthia Nixon Says Being Gay is a Choice. And She's Wrong, 
AMERICABLOG (Jan. 23, 2012, 11 :49 PM), http://americablog.com/2012/0l/actress-cynthia-nixon-
says-being-gay-is-a-choice-and-shes-wrong.htrnl. 
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word, the technically precise term for my orientation is bisexual. I be-
lieve bisexuality is not a choice, it is a fact. What I have 'chosen' is to be 
in a gay relationship. As I said in the Times and will say again here, I do, 
however, believe that most members of our community-as well as the 
majority of heterosexuals-cannot and do not choose the gender of the 
persons with whom they seek to have intimate relationships because, un-
like me, they are only attracted to one sex."13 
The strong, swift, and negative reaction to the comments from Nixon 
and Richardson, both supporters of LGBT rights, exemplify the way dis-
sent within the LGBT community on the issue of the origins of sexual ori-
entation is received. Nixon is not alone in having concerns about innateness 
and immutability and their relevance to LGB rights. A significant minority 
of LGBT rights supporters, many of them LGBT people themselves, are 
critical of etiological arguments for LGB rights. Similarly, various scholars 
in law and other disciplines, including myself, who are personally support-
ive of LGBT rights and whose scholarship is supportive of LGBT rights, 
have been critical of these arguments from etiology. 14 
In this Article, I consider arguments from etiology for LGB rights. I 
begin, in Part II, by articulating these arguments and the ethical, scientific, 
and legal support for them. In Part III, I consider ethical, pragmatic, and 
bioethical problems with these arguments, problems that to some extent 
undergird dissent about etiological arguments for LGB rights. In Part IV, I 
discuss immutability in the legal context in detail, considering the ways in 
which arguments about the immutability of sexual orientation have-and 
have not-worked in U.S. courts. In Part V, I use the preceding analysis as 
a lens to evaluate immutability arguments in amicus briefs associated with 
the two same-sex marriages cases recently decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, namely, US. v. Windsor15 and Hollingsworth v. Perry. 16 In particu-
lar, I focus on the amicus brief on behalf of the Gay and Lesbian Medical 
Association, the largest and oldest association of LGBT health care profes-
13. Grindley, supra note 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14. See, e.g., EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY AND ETHICS 
OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 277-327 (1999) [hereinafter STEIN, MISMEASURE]; Janet E. Halley, Sexual 
Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 ST AN. L. 
REV. 503 (1993-1994); David A.J. Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Classification: 
An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 
491 , 501-07 (1994); Edward Stein, Sexual Orientations, Rights, and the Body: Immutability, Essential-
ism, and Nativism, 78 Soc. RES.: AN INT'L Q. 633 (2011); Edward Stein, The Relevance of Scientific 
Research Concerning Sexual Orientation to Lesbian and Gay Rights, 35 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 107 
(1994); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the 
Case of "Don 't Ask, Don 't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998). 
15 . 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (finding unconstitutional the part of the Defense of Marriage Act 
("DOMA") that defined marriage for purposes of federal law as between one man and one woman). 
16. 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013) (case concerning California's "Proposition 8" a referendum that 
amended that state ' s constitution to define marriage as between one man and one woman). 
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sionals,17 and the amicus brief on behalf of Dr. Paul McHugh, a professor 
of psychiatry at the medical school at Johns Hopkins University,18 which 
were both filed in Windsor and Perry. I conclude by synthesizing ideas 
from each of these briefs using the insights from earlier Parts as a filter. 
Although the two briefs represent interventions from opposing sides of the 
debate about LGB rights, considering what each says about arguments from 
etiology helps illuminate the pitfalls of making innateness and immutability 
arguments for LGB rights. Specifically, these scientific claims are not nec-
essary to make the case for LGB rights and some scientific claims made in 
these briefs are dubious, unsupported, overly simplistic, and/or simply 
false. Further, some scientific-based arguments mischaracterize what is 
wrong with sexual-orientation discrimination. My overall goal is to evalu-
ate arguments from etiology both generally and as they play out in LGB 
rights litigation practically. Doing so, will help explain and contextualize 
disagreement within the LGBT community about the wisdom and effec-
tiveness of such arguments. 
I. "BORN THAT WA y" AND "NOT A CHOICE" ARGUMENTS 
A. The Argument Forms 
The two types of arguments from etiology for LGB rights are each 
based on a distinct scientific claim about how sexual orientations develop. 
"Born that way" arguments start with the biological or genetic claim that 
sexual orientations are innate; alternatively, "not a choice" arguments start 
with the psychological claim that sexual orientations are impossible ( or 
almost impossible) to change or are not the result of choices. Both argu-
ments begin with a scientific claim that is supposed to lead to a legal or 
ethical conclusion in support of LGB rights. 
Consider the following argument for LGB rights made by Andrew 
Sullivan: 
[H]omosexuality is an essentially involuntary condition that can neither 
be denied nor permanently repressed . . ; . [S]o long as homosexual adults 
as citizens insist on the involuntary nature of their condition, it becomes 
politically impossible to deny or ignore the fact of homosexuali-
ty .... [The strategy for obtaining LGB rights is to] seek full public 
17. Brief of Amicus Curiae GLMA: Health Professional Advancing LGBT Equality (Gay and 
Lesbian Medical Association) Concerning the Immutability of Sexual Orientations in Support of Affir-
mance on the Merits, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Nos. 12-307) [hereinafter GLMA Brief]. 
18. Amicus Curiae Brief of Dr. Paul McHugh in Support of Hollingsworth and Bipartisan Legal 
Advocacy Group Addressing the Merits and Supporting Reversal, Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 
12-144) and Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) [hereinafter McHugh Brief]. 
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equality for those who, through no fault of their own, happen to be ho-
mosexual.19 
The structure of Sullivan's argument is as follows: 
( n 1) Same-sex sexual attractions are involuntary. [ scientific claim] 
(n2) It is wrong to punish people or otherwise discriminate against 
them for something they did not choose and cannot change. 
(n3) Therefore, it is wrong to punish or otherwise discriminate against 
LGB people. [normative conclusion] 
While the "not a choice" argument begins with a psychological claim 
about sexual orientation, the "born that way" argument begins with a bio-
logical or genetic claim about sexual orientation. The structure of the "born 
that way" argument is as follows: 
(b 1) Sexual orientations are prenatally determined. [ scientific claim] 
(b2) It is wrong to punish people or otherwise discriminate against 
people for characteristics that are determined before birth. 
(b3) Therefore, it is wrong to punish or otherwise discriminate against 
LGB people. [normative conclusion] 
Both forms of the argument from etiology are intuitively plausible: it 
seems wrong to punish or withhold benefits from someone for doing some-
thing that she cannot help but do. 
B. Scientific Premises 
The popularity of arguments from etiology in the United States in-
creased dramatically starting in the early 1990s with the publication of 
several scientific studies on the causes of homosexuality that captured the 
attention of many Americans.20 With evidence from neuroscience, genetics, 
and psychology purporting to show that sexual orientation is either inborn 
or fixed at an early age, scientists, politicians, activists, religious leaders, 
and commentators began to appeal to scientific evidence to support LGB 
rights.2 1 
19. ANDREWSULLIVAN,VIRTUALLYN0RMAL 170-71 (1995). 
20. See J. Michael Bailey & Richard C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 48 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1089 (1991); Dean H. Harner et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on 
the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCI. 321 (1993); Simon LeVay, A Difference in 
Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 SCI. 1034 (1991). 
21. See, e.g., David Gelman et al., Born or Bred, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1992, at 46, available at 
EBSCOhost, Accession No. 9202243553; Jamie Talan, Study Shows Homosexuality is Innate: Gay 
Scientist is a Hero and a Villain, NEWSDAY, Dec. 9, 1991, at 4, available at 1991 WLNR 317603. 
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1. Biological/Genetic Premise 
Consider first the scientific claims associated with the "born that way" 
argument. In at least one sense, there seems to be a consensus that sexual 
orientations22 are innate, genetic, or biologically based. Indeed, every psy-
chological characteristic is in a sense biologically based. Specifically, hu-
man beings can have a sexual orientation while bricks and one-celled or-
organisms cannot. This is because the physical characteristics (broadly 
construed) that make each of us a human-rather than a brick or an amoe-
ba-also make it possible for each of us to have a sexual orientation. The 
same sort of claim is true, however, with respect to having a favorite type 
of music. A brick and a single-celled organism cannot have a favorite type 
of music. Even though a preference for classical music seems a paradig-
matic example of a learned trait, the mental and physical characteristics 
necessary for having musical preferences are innate, genetic, and biologi-
cally based. Sexual orientation is at least biologically based in the same 
sense that musical preferences are. Any even vaguely plausible theory 
about how people develop sexual orientations ( even one that sees social 
factors as playing a crucial role in shaping a person's sexual orientation) is 
a biological theory in this sense. As William Byne said, "The salient ques-
tion about biology and sexual orientation is not whether biology is involved 
but how it is involved."23 
To better understand the scientific claims at issue in the "born that 
way" argument, consider the range of ways in which traits might be biolog-
ically based. Consider first a person's eye color, a trait that is about as bio-
logically based as can be. This does not, however, mean that a person's eye 
color is completely and unalterably determined by genes. There are various 
links between genes and eye color. Genes code for patterns of protein syn-
thesis. Proteins lead to the development of hormones, other proteins, and, 
under the right circumstances, to the standard development of eyes. The 
appropriate proteins will be synthesized only given certain environmental 
conditions (such as the availability of various chemical compounds in the 
body). Further, these proteins will lead to the standard development of eyes 
only given appropriate developmental conditions. If a developing human 
fetus fails to get water and certain vitamins and minerals, it will fail to de-
velop eyes of the color typically associated with the fetus's genes; for ex-
22. I use the term "sexual orientation" to refer to a person's sexual desires towards and disposi-
tions to engage in sexual behaviors with others in virtues of their sex or gender. See STEIN, 
MISMEASURE, supra note 14, at 49. 
23. William Byne, The Biological Evidence Challenged, 270 Sci. AM. 50, 50 (May 1994) (empha-
sis added). 
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ample, in the face of severe lack of the appropriate compounds, an infant 
might fail to develop functional eyes. The point is that there are various 
intervening environmental factors between having a certain gene configura-
tion and having eyes of a certain color. In spite of this, because a person's 
genes strongly dispose him or her to develop a certain eye color, eye color 
is said to be biologically based. 
Consider, in contrast, a person's musical tastes. This characteristic is 
quite different from eye color with respect to the degree to which it is bio-
logically based; a person's musical tastes seem weakly biologically based. 
Biology does, however, have something to do with musical taste. An 
amoeba cannot have musical tastes. Further, biological differences between 
individuals do contribute in some way to their different tastes in music. For 
example, people who have genes for especially good hearing might be 
more likely to appreciate certain kinds of music (perhaps more subtle or 
intricate music). Still, the connection to genes is much less direct and the 
contributions of the environment are much more significant in the case of 
musical tastes as compared to eye color. 
Using these two simple examples, imagine a continuum representing 
the contribution of biological factors to a trait: at one end is eye color and 
at the other end is taste in music. The debate about the extent to which sex-
ual orientation is biologically based is, roughly, a debate about where sexu-
al orientation falls on this continuum. The "born that way" argument starts 
with a strong claim about the biological basis of sexual orientation, namely 
that sexual orientations are inborn, strongly constrained by genetics, or 
determined by biological factors like the level of certain hormones in a 
fetus or very young children. In terms of the continuum, the scientific claim 
is that sexual orientations are close to eye color and far from musical tastes. 
Sexual orientations cannot, however, be biologically based in quite the way 
eye color is because sexual orientations are cognitively mediated, that is, 
having a sexual orientation requires mental states such as beliefs, desires, 
and thoughts. The scientific claim of the "born that way" argument is that a 
person's biological make-up at birth or at an early age determines or 
strongly constrains his or her sexual orientation, in particular, it determines 
or strongly constrains whether a person is attracted primarily to men or 
women or both. 
Providing a detailed account of the scientific support for or against 
this claim is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, a brief summary will 
suffice. Starting in the early 1990s, there were several apparent break-
throughs in scientific research on sexual orientation that appeared in top 
scientific journals. Most notably, Simon LeVay's neuroanatomical study 
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that reported differences between gay and heterosexual men in a region of 
the hypothalamus;24 Michael Bailey, Richard Pillard, and their collabora-
tors' heritability studies using twins as subjects;25 and Dean Hamer, Angela 
Pattatucci, and their collaborators' genetic linkage study focusing on par-
ticular region of the X-chromosome.26 Playing a supporting role are studies 
of the sexual behaviors and desires of animals that suggest animals exhibit 
sexual behaviors and preferences that are, in significant ways, similar to 
human sexual behaviors and sexual orientation.27 Identifying same-sex 
sexual behaviors and same-sex sexual desires in non-human animals 
demonstrates that human sexual orientation, generally, and human homo-
sexuality, more particularly, are viable subjects of scientific study and are 
open to biological explanation. Some saw these studies as mutually sup-
porting and pointing towards a unified theory of human sexual orientation 
according to which sexual orientations are strongly biological and either 
inborn or determined at an early age.28 Despite this, various commentators 
have offered systematic critiques of this research program, raising serious 
methodological and interpretive concerns that, in my view, completely 
undermine the scientific support for these theories and entail that we do not 
know all that much about how sexual orientations develop.29 
24. See Le Vay, supra note 20. 
25. See Bailey & Pillard, supra note 20; see also J. Michael Bailey et al. , Heritable Factors 
Influence Sexual Orientation in Woman, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 217 (1993). 
26. See Hamer et al., supra note 20; see also Stella Hu et al., Linkage Between Sexual Orientation 
and Chromosome Xq28 in Males but Not in Females, 11 NATURE GENETICS 248 (1995); Angela M. L. 
Pattatucci & Dean H. Hamer, Development and Familiality of Sexual Orientation in Females, 25 
BEHAV. GENETICS 407 (1995). Other, less noteworthy studies from around the same time include, e.g., 
J.A.Y. Hall & D. Kimura, Dermatoglyphic Asymmetry and Sexual Orientation in Men, 108 BEHAV. 
NEUROSCIENCE 1203 (1994); and Dennis McFadden & Edward G. Pasanen, Comparison of the Audito-
ry Systems of Heterosexuals and Homosexuals: Click-Evoked Otoacoustic Emissions, 95 PROC. NAT'L 
ACAD. SCI. 2709 {1998). 
27. See, e.g., BRUCE BAGEMIHL, BIOLOGICAL EXUBERANCE: ANIMAL HOMOSEXUALITY AND 
NATURAL DIVERSITY 269 (1999); M. J. Baum et al., Prenatal and Neonatal Testosterone Exposure 
Interact to Affect Differentiation of Sexual Behavior and Partner Preference in Female Fe"ets, 104 
BEHA v . NEUROSCIENCE 183 (I 990); Jean-Francois Ferveur et al., Genetic Feminization of Brain Struc-
tures and Changed Sexual Orientation in Male Drosophila, 267 SCI. 902 ( 1995); George L. Hunt Jr. & 
Molly Warner Hunt, Female-Female Pairing in Western Gulls (Larus occidentalis) in Southern Cali-
fornia, 196 SCI. 1466 (1977); Charles E. Roselli et al., The Volume of a Sexual Dimorphic Nucleus in 
the Ovine Medial Preoptic Area/Anterior Hypothalamus Varies with Sexual Partner Preference, 145 
ENDOCRINOLOGY 478 (2004). 
28. Simon Le Vay & Dean H. Hamer, Evidence for a Biological Influence in Male Homosexuality, 
SCI. AM., May 1994, at 44; Edward Stein, Evidence for Queer Genes: An Interview with Richard Pil-
lard, 1 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUDIES 93 (1993) [hereinafter Pillard Interview]. 
29. For some critiques, see STEIN, MISMEASURE, supra note 14, at 164-228; William Byne & 
Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual Orientation: The Biologic Theories Reappraised, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 228 (1993); see also SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES (Vernon A. Rosario ed. 1997); 
SEX, CELLS, AND SAME-SEX DESIRE: THE BIOLOGY OF SEXUAL PREFERENCE (John P. Dececco & 
David Allen Parker eds. 1995). 
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2. Choice and Malleability 
Turning to the "not a choice" argument, the scientific premise of this 
argument concerns the malleability of sexual orientations or the role of 
choice in their development--either the claim that a person's sexual orien-
tation cannot be changed or the claim that a person's sexual orientation is 
not a choice. Choice and malleability are distinct but related claims and 
both are conceptually related to the origins of sexual orientations. 
Many characteristics that are chosen are malleable (for example, one's 
career) and some characteristics that are not chosen are not malleable (for 
example, eye color). A characteristic can, however, be the result of choice 
but not be malleable once it is chosen. For example, deciding to have one's 
ovaries removed (perhaps to prevent ovarian cancer) is a choice, but the 
resulting state of one's reproductive system is not changeable. Also, a char-
acteristic can be not chosen but still malleable. For example, a person does 
not choose to have an overbite, but this can be changed by enlisting the 
assistance of an orthodontist. 
Some characteristics that are strongly biological, like blood type, are 
neither the result of choice nor malleable. Other characteristics, however, 
that are neither chosen nor malleable are not strongly biologically deter-
mined. For example, a person's native language is not innate, but a person 
does not choose her native language. Further, a person's native language, 
once it becomes cognitively entrenched, may not be changeable ( even 
though one can stop speaking one's native language and/or become fluent 
in a new language). 30 
Choice might play a role in the development of characteristics that are 
strongly biologically determined. It might be, for example, that some peo-
ple are born with the potential for a musical ability that few have. Deci-
sions such people make may affect the development and expression of this 
ability. Having a well-developed musical ability is plausibly mutable be-
cause whether and how this trait is expressed depends on a person's choic-
es ( conscious or not). Not all biologically based traits are like this-no 
choice is involved in the development of blood type-but some traits, 
though strongly biologically based, involve choices in order to be ex-
pressed. 
A characteristic can be fixed as the result of choices that, on the sur-
face, seem to have nothing to do with the characteristic that they determine. 
For example, a child's decision to frequently play certain video games may 
30. See generally STEVEN PINK.ER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES 
LANGUAGE (1994). 
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have unintentionally led him or her to develop a violent temper as an adult. 
Without ever deciding to have a violent temper, the decision to play video 
games may have led to its development. If this were true, it is unclear 
whether it would be correct to say one chose to have a temper or that such a 
trait is immutable. 
Returning to sexuality, people do not develop sexual orientations 
simply by considering what sexual orientation they want to have in the way 
one might decide what entree to order in a restaurant. Similarly, no one 
thinks a person can change her sexual orientation as easily as one can 
change her shirt or hairstyle. Developing or changing a sexual orientation is 
on any plausible view much more complicated. The scientific premise of 
the "not a choice" argument says more than that sexual orientations are not 
chosen in the trivial sense. Rather, with respect to malleability, the claim is 
that sexual orientations, however they develop, are entrenched at an early 
age and are very difficult, if not impossible, to change. With respect to 
choice, the claim is that either sexual orientations are inborn or, if the result 
of post-natal environmental factors, they are not the result of conscious 
choices. What is the scientific support for these psychological claims about 
sexual orientation? To address this question, I discuss choice and malleabil-
ity separately. 
a. choice 
Setting aside the claim that sexual orientations are strongly biological, 
consider the evidence that sexual orientations are not chosen. Part of what 
seems plausible about the claim that people do not choose their sexual ori-
entation is "introspective" evidence. Andrew Sullivan, for example, when 
asked what evidence there is that sexual orientations are not chosen 
"repl[ied] quite simply: my life."31 Few people recall choosing a sexual 
orientation. They may recall having made lots of decisions that relate in 
various ways to their sexual orientation-such as whether to engage in 
certain sexual behaviors and whether and in what contexts to identify as 
having a particular sexual orientation-but these decisions are different 
from choosing a sexual orientation. The introspective evidence against the 
idea that sexual orientations are chosen is the feeling of most men and 
many women in this culture, regardless of their sexual orientation, that they 
didn't choose their sexual orientations and desires. 
Related to this introspective evidence is "sociological" evidence that 
sexual orientations are not chosen. Most gay men and many lesbians expe-
31. See SULLNAN, supra note 19, at 15-16. 
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rience their sexual orientations as not chosen. In a book entitled Is It a 
Choice?, Eric Marcus wrote, "Why would I choose to be something that 
horrifies my parents, that could ruin my career, that my religion condemns, 
and that could cost me my life if I dared to walk down the street holding 
hands with my boyfriend?"32 The suggestion is that sexual orientation is 
not chosen, because, if it were, there would be far fewer LGB people. 
Such introspective and sociological evidence are both of limited value. 
The introspective evidence is based on people's own retrospective judg-
ments about their own psychosexual development. Such judgments are 
likely to be plagued by memory bias. If a person were asked to describe his 
or her behaviors as a child, it seems quite likely that his or her description 
and assessment of his or her childhood behaviors will be influenced by his 
or her past and present self-assessment and self-identity in terms of gender, 
sexual orientation, and the like. In particular, LGB people may remember 
being gender-atypical children partly because they have internalized the 
stereotype that gay men are feminine and lesbians are masculine.33 Similar-
ly, heterosexuals may forget or reinterpret childhood gender-atypical be-
haviors as gender-typical. LGB people may over report and heterosexuals 
under report gender-atypical behavior.34 
More generally, self-perception can be profoundly affected by experi-
ence, especially the feedback one gets from others. For this reason, it would 
not be surprising if LGB people internalized some of the cultural assump-
tions about sexual orientation and their origins. Specifically, memory bias 
problems seem likely to occur in retrospective studies of sexual orienta-
tion35 due to the charged nature of sexual orientation in our society, the 
central role most people feel it plays in their character, and, for lesbians and 
gay men, the sense of needing to explain homosexuality to oneself and to 
others. In addition to these specific problems with introspective evidence of 
the development of sexual orientation, there are more general problems 
with introspective evidence about one's own cognitive processes and un-
32. ERIC MARCUS, IS IT A CHOICE?: ANSWERS TO 300 OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS ABOUT GAYS AND LESBIANS 9 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). 
33. Michael W. Ross, Retrospective Distortion in Homosexual Research, 9 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 523,524 (1980). 
34. J. Michael Bailey & Kenneth J. Zucker, Childhood Sex-Typed Behavior and Sexual Orienta-
tion: A Conceptual Analysis and Quantitative Review, 31 DEV. PYSCHOL. 43, 45 (1995). 
35. A retrospective study of sexual orientation is one which asks adults about their prior sexual 
feelings, sexual activities, gender identifications, relationships with parents, and the like. One of the 
most detailed retrospective studies of sexual orientation is reported in ALAN P. BELL ET AL., SEXUAL 
PREFERENCE: IT'S DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN (1981 ). 
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conscious beliefs as demonstrated by implicit bias research in social psy-
chology.36 
Further, some people experience their own sexual orientation as cho-
sen. Various studies of LGB people showed that some, especially some 
women37, say that choices played a role in the development of their sexual 
orientation. 38 
Turning to the suggestion that sexual orientation is not a choice, be-
cause, if it were, there would be no LGB people in societies that treat LGB 
people poorly. People choose to embrace all sorts of unpopular positions, 
identities, and practices even in the face of strong social pressure to con-
form. For example, people openly identified as communists during the 
McCarthy era, and many Jewish people continued to publicly identify as 
Jews and openly engage in religious practices associated with Judaism 
during times of virulent anti-Semitism. These facts surely do not show that 
being an avowed communist or an observant Jew are not choices. Similar-
ly, the fact that there are many LGB people in societies that treat LGB peo-
ple poorly does not establish that choice is a non-factor in being gay, lesbi-
lesbian, or bisexual. 
Setting aside the biological evidence relating to the development of 
sexual orientations, the evidence that sexual orientations are not chosen is 
not especially strong. This does not, however, mean that sexual orientations 
are consciously chosen. Most people's sexual orientations are almost cer-
tainly not the result of choosing to have that sexual orientation, but having 
a particular sexual orientation could well involve some choices. 39 As noted 
earlier, a characteristic can be fixed by choices that seem to have nothing to 
do with the characteristic such choices determine. 40 
Even if sexual orientations are not innate and even though there is no 
good evidence about the role of choice in the development of sexual orien-
tations, there are strong reasons for doubting that people consciously chose 
their sexual orientation. 
36. For a summary of this research for a legal audience, see generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses 
of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005). 
37. See, e.g., CLAUDIA CARD, LESBIAN CHOICES (1995); LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: 
UNDERSTANDING WOMEN'S LOVE AND DESIRE 166-67 (2008). 
38. See generally VERA WHISMAN, QUEER BY CHOICE: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE POLITICS 
OF IDENTITY (1996). 
39. See STEIN, MISMEASURE, supra note 14, at 258-74. 
40. See supra Part 11.B.2.; see also DIAMOND, supra note 37, at 251 . 
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b. malleability 
Adult sexual orientations are difficult-and for some people basically 
impossible-to change.41 Many LGB people have struggled with their at-
traction to people of the same sex and some have spent years of wrenching 
psychotherapy or gone through physically taxing procedures to try to 
change their sexual orientation.42 Some feminists who, for ideological rea-
sons, want to be lesbians find themselves acting on heterosexual desires.43 
Although most psychologists and scientists with expertise in this area be-
lieve that sexual orientations are basically fixed by early adulthood at the 
latest and very difficult to change after that time, 44 there is some suggestive 
evidence that a small number of highly-motivated individuals can, for at 
least some period of time, change their sexual behaviors and their sexual 
identities.45 While the American Psychiatric Association and other profes-
sional organizations are skeptical about such treatment,46 various "conver-
41. See, e.g., Jack Drescher, Sexual Conversion ("Reparative") Therapies: History and Update, in 
MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 'TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 71 (Billy E. 
Jones & Marjorie J. Hill eds., 2002); SEXUAL CONVERSION THERAPY: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND 
RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES (Ariel Shidlo et al. eds. 2002); JANIS S. BOHAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND SEXUAL 
ORIENT A TION: COMING TO TERMS 19 (1996). 
42. See generally MARTIN DUBERMAN, CURES: A GAY MAN'S ODYSSEY (1992). 
43. See, e.g., Joyce Trebilcot, Taking Responsibility for Sexuality, in PHILOSOPHY AND SEX 421 
(Robert Baker & Frederick Elliston eds., rev. ed. 1984); SANDRA LEE BARTKY, FEMININITY AND 
DoMINA TION: STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF OPPRESSION 45-62 ( 1990). 
44. See, e.g., Douglas C . . Haldeman, Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy for Gay Men and 
Lesbians: A Scientific Examination, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PuBLIC 
POLICY 149 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds. 1991); Douglas C. Haldeman, The Practice 
and Ethics of Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 221 
(1994); Timothy Mwphy, Redirecting Sexual Orientation: Techniques and Justifications, 29 J. SEX 
RES. 501 (1992); Charles Silverstein, Psychological and Medical Treatments of Homosexuality, in 
HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 101 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. 
Weinrich eds. 1991). Note that this evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with the feelings of many 
women and some men feel their sexual orientations are fluid and that some conscious choice is involved 
in the development of sexual orientation. See, e.g, CARD, supra note 37, at47-57; Carla Golden, Diver-
sity and Variability in Women 's Sexual Identities, in LESBIAN PSYCHOLOGIES: EXPLORATIONS AND 
CHALLENGES 19 (Boston Lesbian Psychologies Collective ed., 1987); WHISMAN, supra note 38. 
45. See, e.g., Robert Spitzer, Can Some Gay Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual Orientation? 
200 Participants Reporting a Change from Homosexual to Heterosexual Orientation, 32 ARCHIVES 
SEXUAL BEHAV. 403 (2003), reprinted in EX-GAY RESEARCH: ANALYZING THE SPITZER STUDY AND 
ITS RELATION TO SCIENCE, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 35 {Jack Drescher & Kenneth J. Zucker 
eds., 2006) [hereinafter EX-GAY RESEARCH] (finding that for some LGB people, "conversion" therapy 
allows them to make "major changes from predominantly homosexual orientation to a predominantly 
heterosexual orientation"); Ariel Shidlo & Michael Schroeder, Changing Sexual Orientation: A Con-
sumers' Report, 33 PROF. PSYCH.: RES. & PRAC. 249, 257 (2002) (finding that a minority (4%) of 
consumers of sexual orientation "conversion" therapy were "helped in shifting their sexual orienta-
tion"); A. Lee Beckstead, Cures Versus Choices: Agendas in Sexual Reorientation Therapy, 5:3/4 J. 
GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 87 (2001), reprinted in SEXUAL CONVERSION THERAPY: ETHICAL, 
CLINICAL, AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 87 {Ariel Shidlo et al. eds. 2001) {arguing that "conversion" 
therapy helps some people with same-sex attractions to have satisfactory heterosexual lives). 
46. Commission on Psychotherapy by Psychiatrists, American Psychiatric Association, Position 
Statement on Therapies Focuses on Attempts to Change Sexual Orientation (Reparative or Conversion 
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sion" therapies-also called "reparative therapies," "re-orientation" pro-
grams, or ex-gay programs-have come into existence and attained some 
notoriety.47 
Much of the psychological evidence supporting success in "convert-
ing" LGB people into heterosexuals suffers from methodological or design 
problems. For example, one study published in a respected journal reported 
successful spiritual treatment of LGB people.48 As Janis Bohn has ex-
plained: 
[This study's successful treatment was of] eleven [gay men] from an ini-
tial pool of300 "dissatisfied "gay men, of whom thirty were studied .... 
There is no explanation of why the other 270 ... were excluded, nor why 
the other nineteen from this sample of thirty were not followed. Alt-
hough success was defined by these authors as a complete shift in sexual 
orientation, of the eleven "successes," only three ( of eleven, of thirty, of 
300) reported no lingering same-sex fantasies.49 
A recent study by Robert Spitzer claimed to show that some gay and bisex-
ual men could become heterosexual.SO Numerous commentators raised 
serious objections to Spitzer's methodology and conclusions,51 and, ulti-
mately, Spitzer retracted his study.52 
The overwhelming evidence indicates that, for most people, sexual 
orientations are not consciously chosen and are very difficult or impossible 
to change. This suggests that sexual orientations do not need to be biologi-
cally determined in order to be immutable. Sexual orientations could be 
impervious to change even if they were caused by social experiences.53 
Therapies), 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1719, 1720 (2000) ("APA recommends that ethical practitioners 
refrain from attempts to change individuals' sexual orientation"). This statement also mentions that the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, the American Psychological 
Association, and the National Association of Social Workers also oppose "conversion" therapy. Id. at 
1719. 
47. For advocates of such conversion therapies, see generally JOSEPH NICOLOSI, REPARATIVE 
THERAPY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A NEW CLINICAL APPROACH (1991); JEFFREY SANTIOVER, 
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE PoLmcs OF TRUTH (1996). For critical discussion of "ex-gay" programs 
see generally BESEN, supra note 11; TANYA ERZEN, STRAIGHT TO JESUS: SEXUAL AND CHRJSTIAN 
CONVERSIONS IN THE EX-GAY MOVEMENT (2006); MICHELLE WOLKOMIR, BE NOT DECEIVED: THE 
SACRED AND SEXUAL STRUGGLES OF GAY AND EX-GAY CHRJSTIAN MEN (2006). 
48. E.Mansel Pattison & Myrna Loy Pattison, "Ex-Gays ": Religiously Mediated Change in Ho-
mosexuals, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1553 (1980). 
49. BOHAN,supranote41,at20. 
50. EX-GAY RESEARCH, supra note 45. 
51. See generally, id. 
52. Robert L. Spitzer, Spitzer Reassesses His 2003 Study of Reparative Therapy of Homosexuality, 
41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHA V. 757 (2012) (Letter to the Editor); Gabriel Arana, My So-Called Ex-Gay 
Life, THE AMERJCAN PROSPECT (Apr. 11, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/my-so-called-ex-gay-life. 
53. See STEIN, MISMEASURE, supra note 14, at 258-74. 
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C.Law 
Having articulated the etiological arguments for lesbian and gay rights 
and the scientific claims that are crucial to them, I turn now to the legal 
context into which these arguments fit. A primary source of civil rights in 
the United States is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution.54 The Supreme Court has interpreted this 
clause as requiring great scrutiny and skepticism towards laws that make 
use of certain classifications. In the terminology of contemporary equal 
protection jurisprudence, these "suspect" classifications are subject to 
"heightened" scrutiny. Although the Supreme Court suggested in 1872 that 
the only laws that would be found unconstitutional because of the Equal 
Protection Clause were those that make use of racial classifications, 55 the 
Court in 1886 used this clause to invalidate laws making use of other clas-
sifications. 56 By 1944, the Court specifically characterized the Fourteenth 
Amendment as requiring strict scrutiny of race-based classifications, ethnic 
classifications, and classifications involving national origin.57 When strict 
scrutiny is applied, the use of a suspect classification in a law must be "jus-
tified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary ... to 
the accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose."58 Although it may seem 
that strict scrutiny is always fatal, the Court has explicitly said this is not 
the case.59 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
55. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872) ("We doubt very much whether any action ofa 
State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, 
will ever be held to come within the purview ofth[e Equal Protection Clause]."). 
56. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens ... . [T]hese provisions are universal in their 
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of 
color, or of nationality."). 
57. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such re-
strictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("th[is] Court's decisions have established that 
classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny"). 
58. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
196 (1964)). 
59. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion 
that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' . .. [W]hen race-based action is necessary to 
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow 
tailoring' test."); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (educational benefits related to 
diversity are compelling enough interests to justify considerations of race even under strict scrutiny); 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 168, 171 (1987) (affirmative action plan constitutional because 
narrowly tailored). 
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Sex classifications receive intermediate scrutiny in contrast to the 
strict scrutiny that racial, ethnic, and nationality classifications receive.60 
When intermediate scrutiny is applied, there must be "important govern-
ment objectives" behind the use of the suspect classifications and the use of 
such classifications must be "substantially related" to these objectives.61 
Sometimes, however, the Court talks about the standard of scrutiny applied 
to sex classifications in terms almost identical to how it talks about strict 
scrutiny.62 Other times, especially when the Court holds that statutes mak-
ing use of sex classifications pass constitutional muster, it treats sex classi-
fications as if they do not warrant as much scrutiny as racial classifications 
do.63 
Laws that use classifications that do not demand great skepticism need 
only pass the much weaker "rational review" test, under which laws are 
held constitutional so long as there is a rational justification for their use. 
Height classifications, for example, have not been held to warrant height-
ened scrutiny. As there are rational reasons why, for example, a fireman 
might be subject to certain height restrictions, such a body attribute would, 
in the context of hiring firefighters, survive rational review. Typically, 
rational review is a very easy standard to satisfy. Statutes that make use of 
non-suspect classifications are afforded "a strong presumption of validi-
ty"64 such that "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis for the classification,"65 the statute will satis-
fy rational review.66 
60. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988) ("Between these extremes of rational basis 
review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to 
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy."). The Court did not settle on intermediate 
scrutiny for sex classifications easily. Before Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Court 
applied rational review to a law that chose men over women, all else being equal, as executors of es-
tates. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). Although a plurality of the Court applied intermediate 
scrutiny in Frontiero in 1972, it was not until 1976 that a majority of the Court applied heightened 
scrutiny to strike down a Jaw that made use of sex classifications. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976) (striking down different age requirements for boys as compared to girls to buy low-alcohol 
beer). 
61. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
62. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,531 (1996) (holding that the justification for 
Jaws that make use of sex-based classifications must be "exceedingly persuasive"). 
63. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 58-59 (2001) (uphold-
ing naturalization provision imposing different requirements for citizenship depending upon whether 
applicant's mother or father was U.S. citizen). 
64. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,314 (1993). 
65. Id. at 313. 
66. The jurisprudence surrounding rational review is more complicated than this description 
suggests. In approximately nine percent of the equal protection cases that applied rational review be-
tween 1972 and 1996, the Court found the statute at issue unconstitutional. See Robert Farrell, Success-
ful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Tenn Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. 
L. REV. 357, 369 (1998-99). Over time; a "more searching form" of rational basis review has emerged 
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A fundameBtal question about this three-tiered scheme (strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, and rational review) concerns what the criteria are 
for determining how much scrutiny a law deserves. In other words, how are 
suspect classifications distinguished from non-suspect ones? The answer is 
far from clear. The Supreme Court did not start to articulate a detailed ac-
count of why certain classifications-but not others-warrant heightened 
scrutiny until the early 1970s. 67 The first time the Court provided such an 
account was in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. In 
refusing to apply heightened scrutiny in a case brought by school children 
from relatively poor school districts, the Court said: 
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none 
of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with 
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess. 68 
Later that same term, the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson 
held that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon 
race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must there-
fore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny."69 In addition to discussing the 
factors mentioned in Rodriguez, the Court included two other factors 
among the "traditional indicia of suspectness" articulated earlier in that 
term. 
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable char-
acteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of 
special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their 
sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that legal bur-
dens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. And 
what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or 
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is 
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to per-
form or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between 
the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class 
that the court has sometimes applied. Most relevantly, this "rational basis with bite", Gayle Lynn Pet-
tinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 802 
(1987), has been applied to sexual-orientation classification in certain contexts. Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 590 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See Windsor v. 
United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180 (2d. Cir. 2012) (noting that some courts have "read the Supreme 
Court's recent cases in this area to suggest that rational basis review should be more demanding"). 
67. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 482,485 (2004). 
68. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
69. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (finding unconstitutional requirements for 
establishing that the spouse of a servicewoman, as compared to a spouse of a serviceman, was a de-
pendent of the service member). 
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of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actu_al capabilities 
of its individual members. 70 
615 
From this invocation of immutability in Frontiero, an equal protection 
hook emerged on which some LGB right advocates hope to hang an argu-
ment from etiology for LGB rights. Such advocates focus on the Supreme 
Court's interest in immutability with the thought that showing sexual orien-
tations are inborn and/or not chosen will lead the Court to deem sexual 
orientation classifications suspect.71 This is the legal context for arguments 
from etiology. 
IL ETHICAL AND RELATED PROBLEMS WITH ARGUMENTS FROM ETIOLOGY 
A. Ethical Problems 
The strength of their scientific premises aside, 72 the "born that way" 
and the "not a choice" arguments face a significant ethical problem; even if 
sexual orientations are innate or not chosen, for any plausible theory of 
sexual orientations much of what is ethically relevant about being an LGB 
person is not innate and not determined and, thus, would not be reached by 
an argument from etiology. Even if sexual orientations are strongly biolog-
ical, actually engaging in sexual acts with a person of the same sex, public-
ly or privately identifying as an LGB person, deciding to establish a 
household with a person of the same sex, and raising children as an openly 
LGB person are choices--choices that one might not make, that is, one can 
decide to be celibate, closeted, single, and childless. To put the point an-
other way, even someone who is convinced that LGB people deserve rights 
only because sexual orientations are innate or immutable might still con-
sistently accept that people can be treated differently on the basis of choic-
es relating to their sexual orientation. One who thinks that LGB people are 
born with their sexual orientations might, because of the "born that way" 
argument or the "not a choice" argument, accept that LGB people should 
not be discriminated against on the basis of their sexual attraction to people 
of the same sex. Such a person could still, however, think that those who 
70. Id. at 686-87 (emphasis added and quotation and citation omitted). 
71. E. Gary Spitko, A Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism-Determinism: Implications for 
Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 571 (1996); Richard Green, The 
Immutability of (Homo)sexual Orientation: Behavioral Science Implications for a Constitutional (Le-
gal) Analysis, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 537 (1988); Harris Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Applica-
tion of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 797, 817-21 (1983-84); Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 576 
(1973). 
72. See, supra text accompanying notes 20-53 for a discussion of the scientific premises. For 
critiques of these scientific premises, see, e.g., notes 29 and 53. 
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engage in sexual acts with people of the same sex are appropriate targets of 
discrimination and that people who have their primary romantic and/or 
domestic relationship with a person of the same sex should not get recogni-
tion for such relationships. Arguments from etiology have the potential to 
protect a person from being discriminated on the mere basis of having a 
desire to have sex with people of the same sex (that is, they have the poten-
tial to protect against discrimination for simply having a sexual orienta-
tion), but this is a very specific and quite limited protection. LGB people 
deserve rights with respect to their actions and decisions rather than simply 
for their orientations. LGB people need protection against discrimination 
especially when they engage in same-sex sexual acts, when they openly 
identify as LGB people, when they are in spouse-like relationships with 
people of the same sex, and when they raise children. The "born that way" 
and the "not a choice" arguments are unable to deliver these basic, signifi-
cant, and important ethical needs. Arguments from etiology are simply 
impotent with respect to the most central claims for LGB rights, namely, 
claims for rights based on choices. 
Martha Nussbaum articulated a version of the argument from etiology 
for LGB rights as follows: 
[M]ost Americans think of sexual fulfillment as one of the greatest goods 
of life, and are inclined to think that it is unreasonable to demand that 
people utterly forgo sexual fulfillment. If they can be persuaded that sex-
ual orientations lie very deep in the personality, then they think that 
same-sex conduct is not at all like adultery or gambling or nude dancing, 
or even smoking (which is of course very difficult to give up). All of 
those forms of conduct could, they think, be omitted without crippling 
the personality .... [A]sking people not to engage in same-sex conduct is 
a cruel and unreasonable demand .... [D]enying people a form of sexual 
fulfillment that cannot be substituted for because of deep factors about 
the organization of their personalities is indeed cruel and unreasonable.73 
I disagree with Nussbaum's optimistic assessment of American atti-
tudes about sex. Many Americans still think that some types of sexual ful-
fillment-even if based on "deep factors" of personality-are morally 
problematic and the state should discourage people from acting on their 
desires to engage in these behaviors, even to the point of putting legal and 
social impediments in the way of engaging in them. Even if we restrict the 
sexual behaviors in question to consensual sex, as Nussbaum does, 74 many 
Americans would still object to these behaviors. For example, there are 
some people who are primarily-perhaps even exclusively-sexually ful-
73. Martha Nussbaum, Millean Liberty and Sexual Orientation: A Discussion of Edward Stein 's 
The Mismeasure of Desire, 21 L. & PHILO. 317,332 (2002). 
74. Id. at 332. 
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filled though sadomasochistic sex, adultery, masturbation, anal sex, non-
procreative sex, sex between adult siblings, asphyxiophilic sex, 75 or group 
sex. Some Americans who believe that sexual orientations are based on 
"deep" personality characteristics will still find these sexual practices im-
moral, appropriate targets for criminal sanctions, and the people who en-
gage in them pariahs. The attitudes of some Americans aside, these 
practices may be illegal ( even if laws against them are not enforced) and 
the people who engage in them may be discriminated against.76 
The core intuition of Nussbaum's argument-that people should not 
be forced to forgo a life of sexual fulfillment (so long as the sexually ful-
filling activities in question are consensual)-is plausible. But the intuition 
is the same whether or not the desire to engage in the sexual activities is 
innate or environmental, a choice or not. Understood this way, Nussbaum's 
defense of arguments from etiology for LGB rights is not really about eti-
ology at all. 
There are two more particular and practical ethical problems for ar-
guments from etiology for LGB rights related to this concern. Insofar as 
there are some people or groups of people with same-sex sexual desires 
whose sexual orientations are neither innate nor immutable, the arguments 
from etiology for LGB rights are particularly impotent. Most notably, some 
scientists studying sexual orientation claim that women's sexual orientation 
is more fluid than men's.77 If some women's sexual orientations---or wom-
en's sexual orientations generally-are mutable, not innate, or to some 
extent chosen, then the argument from etiology for LGB rights will fail to 
apply to women. As the comments of Cynthia Nixon suggest,78 there is a 
similar problem related to bisexuals, who are sexually attracted to both men 
and women and who can be sexually and emotionally fulfilled by relation-
ships with people of either sex.79 Even if being bisexual is innate, immuta-
75. Asphyxiophilia, also known as autoerotic asphyxiation sex or hypoxyphilia, is the practice, 
whether alone or with a sexual partner, of intentionally reducing the amount of oxygen to the brain 
during sexual stimulation in order to heighten the pleasure received from an orgasm. 
76. See, e.g., R v. Brown, [1994] 1 AC 212 (H.L), (1993] 2 All ER 75 (H.L) (appeal from Eng.) 
(sadomasochism); Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2002) (adultery); Lovisi v. Slayton, 
539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976) (en bane) (menage a trois); see generally, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting, inter alia, state laws against bigamy, adult incest, 
masturbation, adultery, and fornication). But see Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (2013) 
(striking down a portion of Utah's laws against polygamy). 
77. See generally DIAMOND, supra note 3 7. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13. 
79. This is a simplification because some bisexuals are attracted to men and women differently, 
for example, some bisexuals may prefer to engage in sexual activities with people of one sex but to 
have their primary emotional and familial attachments with people of another sex. See, e.g., MAR.TIN 
WEINBERG ET AL., DUAL ATTRACTION: UNDERSTANDING BISEXUALITY 39-58 {1994). 
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ble, and/or not a choice, a bisexual could in fact choose to have sex with 
and build relationships with people of a different sex. Even setting aside the 
ethical problem for the arguments from etiology for LGB rights discussed 
above, arguments from etiology would be especially problematic when 
applied to bisexuals. 80 A purported argument for LGB rights that turned out 
to be only effective as applied to the rights of gay men but not to the rights 
of lesbians and bisexuals would clearly be deeply problematic. 
One response to the ethical problems with the arguments from etiolo-
gy for LGB rights is that sometimes scientific evidence about how sexual 
orientations develop is ethically relevant. If, for example, it was established 
that sexual orientations are determined at birth, it might convince otherwise 
skeptical people that there are no problems with LGB people teaching ele-
mentary school. Similarly, showing that sexual orientations are not change-
able once entrenched, might convince people that it is a waste of resources 
to try to change LGB people's sexual orientations81 and perhaps justify 
laws that make it illegal to try to change a person's sexual orientation.82 
Showing, for example, that there is no problem with LGB people being 
teachers is a good thing to do; insofar as scientific evidence can help estab-
lish this, such scientific evidence is ethically relevant. That the argument 
from etiology for LGB rights is impotent is consistent with the claim that 
some scientific evidence about how sexual orientations develop is relevant 
to some specific goals of advocates of LGB rights. Such evidence is, how-
ever, of limited use in making the case for LGB rights generally, which is 
the aim of the arguments from etiology under consideration herein. 
B. Political/Pragmatic Problems 
Some advocates of LGB rights who are aware-at least implicitly--0f 
problems with arguments from etiology still embrace such arguments be-
cause people are persuaded by such arguments despite the problems with 
such etiological arguments.83 This pragmatic approach draws support from 
80. That this issue has been overlooked is not surprising given the erasure of bisexuals in general. 
See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000). 
81 . See, e.g., Pillard Interview, supra note 28, at 98. 
82. See S.B. 1172, 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 835 (2012) (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§§ 865(a), 865.1 (West 2012) (prohibiting "mental health provider[s]" from "engaging in sexual orien-
tation change efforts ... with a patient under 18 . . .. "); Act of August 19, 2013, ch. 150, 2013 N.J. 
Sess. Law Serv. 3371 (S 2278) (same, supplementing Title 45 ofN.J. Revised Statutes). For a pro-LGB 
critique of such laws, see Tia Powell & Edward Stein, When New Desires Conquer: Legal and Ethical 
Concerns about Change in Sexual Orientation, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (forthcoming 2014). 
83. See, e.g., MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL: How AMERICA WILL 
CONQUER ITS FEAR AND HATRED OF GAYS IN THE 90s, 184 (1989) (arguing that LGB people "should 
be considered to have been born gay[,] even though sexual orientation for most humans seems to be a 
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numerous opinion polls spanning more than two decades that show people 
who think homosexuality is biologically based or that sexual orientations 
are not chosen are more likely to favor LGB rights than those who do not.84 
This correlation between pro-LGB attitudes and the belief that sexual ori-
entations are inborn or immutable seems a robust phenomenon that advo-
cates of LGB rights should not ignore. 
This pragmatic strategy is not, however, promising. Linking LGB 
rights to biology is a bad strategy even in political contexts. First, this ar-
gument has not worked historically. Starting around the tum of the twenti-
eth century and continuing until the Nazis' rise to power in Germany, 
Magnus Hirschfeld, a German doctor and sexologist, attempted to gain 
legal protections for homosexuals on the grounds that they constituted a 
third biological sex. A centerpiece of Hirschfeld's lobbying effort for lesbi-
an and gay rights was a version of the "born that way" argument. 85 Prior to 
his death, Hirschfeld conceded not only had he failed to prove his biologi-
cal thesis, but also his use of the "born that way" argument unwittingly 
contributed to the persecution of homosexuals by stigmatizing them as 
biologically defective.86 He presumably had in mind the fact that, in Nazi 
Germany, LGB people, transgender people, and other sexual minorities 
were imprisoned, castrated, mutilated in various ways, and sent to death 
camps to remove them from the "breeding stock. "87 This shows how claim-
ing that sexual orientation is biologically based may not produce a positive 
result for LGB people. More generally, arguments of this form have not 
proven politically effective. It is widely believed-despite significant evi-
complex interaction between innate predispositions and environmental factors during childhood and 
early adolescence"). 
84. See, e.g. , JAMES BUTTON ET AL. , PRIVATE LIVES, PUBLIC CONFLICTS: BATTLES OVER GAY 
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 61 (1997); Clyde Wilcox & Barbara Norrander, Of Moods and 
Morals: The Dynamics of Opinion on Abortion and Gay Rights, in UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC OPINION 
139 (Clyde Wilcox & Barbara Norrander eds., 2d ed. 2002); Clyde Wilcox & Robin Wolpert, Gay 
Rights in the Public Sphere: Public Opinion on Gay and Lesbian Equality, in THE POLITICS OF GAY 
RIGHTS 409 (Craig Rimmerrnan et al., eds. 2000); J.E. Aguero et al., The Relationship Among Beliefs, 
Attitudes, Experience and Homophobia, 10 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 95 (1984); Kurt Emulfet al. , Biological 
Explanation, Psychological Explanation and Tolerance of Homosexuals: A Cross-National Analysis of 
Beliefs and Attitudes, 65 PSYCHOL. REP. 1003 (1989); Donald Haider-Markel & Mark Joslyn, Beliefs 
About the Origins of Homosexuality and Support For Gay Rights: An Empirical Test of Attribution 
Theory, 72 PUB. OPINION Q. 291 (2008); J. Piskur & D. Delegman, Effect of Reading a Summary of 
Research about Biological Bases of Homosexual Orientation on Attitudes Towards Homosexuals, 71 
PSYCHOL. REP. 1219 (1992); B.E. Whitley, The Relationship of Heterosexuals · Attributions for the 
Causes of Homosexuality to Attitudes towards Lesbians and Gay Men, 16 PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (1990). 
85. See, e.g., Rainer Herrn, On the History of Biological Theories of Homosexuality, 28 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 31 (1995), reprinted in SEX, CELLS, AND SAME-SEX DESIRES, supra note 29, at 31. 
86. Id. 
87. See generally RICHARD PLANT, THE PINK TRIANGLE: THE NAZI WAR AGAINST 
HOMOSEXUALS (1986). 
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dence to the contrary88-that race is biologically based. The popularity of 
this belief does not seem to have had a mitigating influence on racism. 
Even granting that the belief in a strong biological basis for homosex-
uality would persuade people to favor LGB rights in the short run, the be-
lief that a characteristic is biologically based does not in any way guarantee 
that people will view this characteristic in a positive light. Many character-
istics coded for by genes-for example, Down's syndrome, Tay Sach's 
syndrome, and to some extent, alcoholism-are viewed as undesirable, 
shameful, and worth going to great lengths to avoid. 
Generally, it is a risky strategy to link LGB rights to the ups and 
downs of scientific research, especially since such research is, at best, in its 
early stages. Biological research into sexual orientation has a poor track 
record when it comes to reliability; what appear to be valid results today 
could turn out to be mistakes. 89 Making LGB rights contingent on a partic-
ular scientific finding is simply too risky. That people are persuaded by 
arguments from etiology may suggest a short-term public relations strategy, 
but it does not suggest a political strategy appropriate for achieving a set of 
important basic civil rights. 
As an example of the risks of connecting particular scientific theories 
with LGB politics, consider the relationship of the LGB movement in 
America to psychiatry.90 In the "pre-Stonewall" stage of the gay rights 
movement (from World War II to the late sixties), many LGB rights activ-
ists embraced psychiatry and its language, partly on political grounds. The 
idea was that psychiatry could help legitimate LGB people and their organ-
izations.91 But as the LGB movement grew, LGB people began to chal-
lenge psychiatry, ultimately protesting against the American Psychiatric 
Association's classification of homosexuality as a psychological disorder. 
Science, medicine, and psychology are tricky ethical and political weapons; 
at best, they are double-edged swords. 
88. See, e.g., K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in COLOR 
CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30 (K. Anthony Appiah & Amy Guttman eds. 1996); 
see generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (rev. ed. 1996). For a relevant legal 
discussion of race and immutability, see Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. R.Ev. 
1375 (1998-1999). 
89. See, e.g., William Byne, Science and Belief Psychobiological Research on Sexual Orienta-
tion, 28 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 303, 336 (1995), reprinted in SEX, CELLS, AND SAME-SEX DESIRES, supra 
note 29. 
90. RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY (Princeton Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 1987). 
91. JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAK.ING OF A HOMOSEXUAL 
MINORITY IN THE UNITED STA TES, 1940-1970, at 116-17 ( 1983 ). 
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A further problem for the pragmatic justifications for arguments from 
etiology is that the very terminology of the biological theories may contrib-
ute to the stigmatization of homosexuality. In some neurological and psy-
chiatric literature, these theories are almost invariably couched in 
pejorative terms such as abnormality, deficiency, aberration and "gene-
controlled disarrangement of psychosexual maturation patterns. "92 Traits 
that are perceived as both innate and undesirable are frequently assumed to 
be amenable to medical remedy or prevention. This might harm the cause 
of LGB rights more than it helps. 
When advocates and allies of LGB rights are dealing with important 
strategic questions about legislation, they have been appropriately hesitant 
about making arguments from etiology. After Vermont's highest court 
ruled that the state constitution required that same-sex couples be able to 
obtain the same rights and benefits that married couples have, the Vermont 
legislature had to decide how to meet this constitutional requirement.93 The 
lawyers who represented the couples seeking legal recognition of their 
relationships before the Vermont Supreme Court testified before a state 
legislative committee considering whether to legalize same-sex marriage as 
opposed to some other way of recognizing same-sex relationships. A legis-
lator asked the lawyers whether sexual orientations-in particular, homo-
sexuality-was inborn or a choice. Instead of making the "born that way" 
or "not a choice" argument, the lawyers argued that it did not matter 
whether sexual orientation is a choice because LGB people deserve equal 
rights to marry however sexual orientations develop.94 This hesitance to 
make arguments from etiology in an important legislative context is not an 
isolated incident.95 The hesitance of advocates for LGB rights to make the 
"born that way" or "not a choice" arguments in important contexts suggests 
that the arguments might not be as politically expedient as some think it is. 
There is another, more limited, pragmatic argument from etiology for 
LGB rights that warrants consideration. Some have argued that arguments 
based on the innateness or immutability of sexual orientations will at least 
92. COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 
4th ed. 1985); see also EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 40-44 (1990); Byne 
& Parsons, supra note 29, at 236. 
93. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
94. DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: THE BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE 183 (2004) (discussing 
testimony of Beth Robinson and Susan Murray before the Vermont's House Judiciary Committee). 
95. See Gary Mucciaroni & M.L. Killian, Immutability, Science, and the Legislative Debate over 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Rights, 47 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53 (2004) (finding, based on study of ten 
legislative debates at various levels of government concerning LGB rights, that arguments from etiolo-
gy for LGB rights were infrequently, if ever, offered by advocates of LGB rights and had little or no 
impact on the debates). 
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discourage psychiatrists, psychologists, and therapists from trying to "cure" 
homosexuality and, thereby, protect minors who are at risk of harm from 
attempts to change their sexual orientation.96 Etiological arguments for 
LGB rights may have some impact (at least in the short term) on how men-
tal health professionals view homosexuality. The strength of this impact 
can, however, easily be overemphasized. Even if a therapist is convinced 
that his patient cannot change her sexual orientation, he might encourage 
the patient to change her behaviors, her sexual and emotional relationships, 
and her public sexual identity. Furthermore, even if he does not try to cure 
a patient's homosexuality, he might still view homosexuality as less desira-
ble than heterosexuality and continue to accept a variety of mistaken and 
potentially harmful stereotypes about LGB people. This could adversely 
affect the therapeutic goals set for LGB patients. Further, there are strong 
arguments against "reparative" or "reorientation" therapies that can be 
made independent of any biological evidence about the origins of sexual 
orientation. One can argue there is no good reason to "convert" homosexu-
als by showing there is nothing wrong with homosexuality.97 
Relatedly, the impact of arguments from etiology for LGB rights will 
be limited because those who think homosexuality is undesirable could, 
when faced with credible scientific evidence that sexual orientations are 
innate and not chosen, simply switch their support away from psychologi-
cal "conversion" therapies to "reorientation" surgery, pharmaceutical inter-
ventions, gene therapy, or reproductive technological interventions.98 
Some advocates of arguments from etiology for LGB rights focus on 
the observation that people who believe sexual orientations are innate, in-
born, or not chosen are much more likely to support LGB rights. I have 
shown that this pragmatic interpretation of etiological arguments for LGB 
rights has problems. Further, I am skeptical about the way such advocates 
implicitly interpret the opinion polls that motivate this pragmatic view of 
arguments froni etiology. These polls establish a correlation between sup-
porting LGB rights and thinking that sexual orientations are innate or not a 
choice; they do not show that supporting LGB rights is caused by believing 
that sexual orientations are innate or not a choice. In fact, the causal con-
96. See, e.g., Karen Ocamb, NCLR Urges CA Guv to Sign Gay Child Abuse Bill, THE BILERICO 
PROJECT (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.bilerico.com/2012/09/nclr_urges_ca_guv _to_sign__gay _chi 
ld_abuse_bill.php; see also Pillard Interview, supra note 28, at 98. 
97. See, e.g., CARLOS BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS: AN EXPLORATION IN POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY (2003); RICHARD MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY IN SOCIETY, ETHICS AND LAW (1990); 
Frederick Suppe, Curing Homosexuality, in PHILOSOPHY AND SEX 391 (Robert Baker and Frederick 
Elliston eds. 1984); David Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of 
Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297 (1998-99). 
98. See infra Part III.C. 
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nection might well be reversed, n~mely supporting LGB rights might make 
people more likely to believe that sexual orientations are biologically based 
or not chosen. Or, these beliefs might both be caused by some third belief. 
The truth of either alternative explanation would undermine the pragmatic 
version of the "born that way" argument. For this reason and the reasons 
discussed above, attempts to make a pragmatic argument for LGB rights 
based on scientific claims that sexual orientations are innate or inborn are 
misguided and futile. 
C. "Bioethical" Problems 
I tum now to another ethical concern about the "born that way" argu-
ment, namely, that it could hasten attempts to use reproductive technolo-
gies to produce heterosexual children, which, in turn, would potentially 
have deleterious effects on the situation fot LGB people. Suppose it was 
widely believed that sexual orientations are strongly genetic. If scientists 
isolate a particular gene sequence associated with homosexuality, then it 
would probably be relatively easy to determine whether a fetus has this 
particular gene sequence. If prospective parents believe that the future sex-
ual orientation of a fetus can be determined through a prenatal screening 
procedure, some of them would make use of such a procedure ( or in some 
other way attempt) to prevent the birth of a fetus deemed to be "at risk" of 
becoming homosexual. 99 
I call techniques for selecting the sexual orientation of children orien-
tation-selection procedures. It seems virtually certain that some prospective 
parents would, if technology permits, seek abortions or use other proce-
dures to prevent the birth of non-heterosexual children_lOO Most people 
(even some lesbians and gay men)101 have a strong preference for having 
99. See Elizabeth Banger & Glenn McGee, Aspiring Parents, Genotypes and Phenotypes: The 
Unexamined Myth of the Perfect Baby, 68 ALB. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2005) (surveying how likely 
people were to want to use selection techniques to prevent or insure a future child would have certain 
characteristics and finding that, of the "unimportant traits," which included, for example, eye color, hair 
color, and sexual orientation, subjects were most likely to want to use selection techniques to prevent 
their future child from being homosexual). 
100. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 308 (1992) ("[Y]ou can be sure that the child's parents 
would (make use of a technique to ensure their child would be straight], believing, probably correctly, 
that he would be better off . . .. "). 
IOI. The reasons some LGB people want heterosexual children are more complicated than why 
straight people do. Some LGB people who want heterosexual children may suffer from internalized 
homophobia; some, having experienced prejudice and discrimination for being an openly LOB person, 
want to their children to avoid a similar fate; and some want to avoid the appearance that LOB parents 
are more likely to produce LGB children. See Fred Kuhr, In Our Parents' Footsteps, THE ADVOCATE 
(June 5, 2006), http://www.advocate.com/politics/commentary/2006/06/05/our-parents-footsteps ( dis-
cussing negative attitudes towards LGB children ofLGB people). 
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heterosexual children. Even supportive parents of LGB people admit that 
they would have tried to insure that their children would be heterosexua1.102 
Making the "born that way" argument in social, political, and legal 
contexts will contribute to attitudes and perceptions about LGB people. 
Emphasis on the claim that sexual orientations are innate would increase 
interest in, the development of, awareness of, and trust in the effectiveness 
of orientation-selection procedures. As some indication of this, note that 
even though no such procedures have been developed thus far, a state law 
was proposed that would have made orientation-selection procedures ille-
gal.I OJ 
If such procedures are available, people will almost certainly make use 
of such procedures even if they do not work. This is partly because it would 
be difficult for people who are considering using orientation-selection pro-
cedures to determine whether such procedures work. The vast majority of 
children tum out to be heterosexual even without the use of such proce-
dures. Because of this, the majority of parents who attempt to select the 
sexual orientation of their children will believe that their interventions have 
been successful even though their children would have been heterosexual 
without the use of orientation-selection procedures. Further, most people 
take a while to figure out their sexual orientation and, for LGB people, it 
may even take longer to start talking about their sexual orientation. Parents 
who make use of an orientation-selection procedure might think their inter-
vention had been successful in part because their child is not yet conscious-
ly aware of his or her sexual orientation or has not yet come out to his or 
her parents. If an LGB person knows that his or her parents used an orienta-
tion-selection procedure to ensure that he or she would be heterosexual, 
this would make it more likely that a person would hide his or her sexual 
orientation from his or her parents. For these reasons, once available, orien-
tation-selection procedures will, even if they do not work, appear to work. 
That orientation-selection procedures will be used even if they do not 
work fits a historic pattern of LGBT people being subjected to various 
102. See Gelman, supra note 21 (quoting a leader of a group supportive of LGB rights as saying 
"[n]o parent would choose to have a child born with any factor that would make life difficult for him or 
her [including homosexuality]"). 
103. " An Act to Protect Homosexuals from Discrimination," L.D. 908, 122nd Leg. Sess. (Me. 
2005) (" An abortion may not be performed when the basis for the procedure is the projected sexual 
orientation of the fetus after birth, based on analysis of genetic materials of the fetus in which sexual 
orientation is identified through the presence or absence of a so-called 'homosexual gene."'). According 
to a news account, this bill was proposed by Brian Duprey, an ardent pro-lifer, who "received the idea 
for this bill when listening to the Rush Limbaugh radio show. ' I heard Rush saying that the day the 'gay 
gene' is determined to be real, that overnight gays would become pro-life."' New Maine House Bill 
Would Protect Fetuses Carrying the 'Gay Gene ', MAGIC CITY MORNING STAR (Feb. 24, 2005) 
http://magic-city-news.com/article_3 l 73.shtml. The bill died in the House Judiciary Committee. 
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forms of medical and psychological interventions for which there is no 
evidence of effectiveness. 104 For example, gay men were injected with 
testosterone with the aim of turning them into heterosexuals despite studies 
showing no correlation between sexual orientation and testosterone lev-
els.105 Even if the evidence supporting the claim that sexual orientations are 
genetic is weak, some people will probably still believe that orientation-
selection procedures work and will make use of them. The result could well 
be the widespread use of techniques to avoid the birth of children thought 
to be carrying genes for homosexuality or bisexuality. Even if orientation-
selection procedures do not work, their availability, the acceptability of 
their use, and the knowledge that they are used will shape attitudes towards 
LGB people. Specifically, the emergence of orientation-selection proce-
dures will likely reinforce the preference for heterosexual over homosexual 
children. Making the "born that way" argument will likely increase interest 
in and spur the development of orientation-selection procedures and, when 
such procedures are offered-whether or not they work-the "born that 
way" argument will contribute to awareness of such procedures and trust in 
their effectiveness. In so doing, making the "born that way" argument will 
potentially have negative effects on the social climate for LGB people. 
Additionally and relatedly, making the "born that way" argument will 
encourage the view that LGB people are diseased. Until recently, most 
people viewed homosexuality as a disease. Although some people, among 
them some doctors and psychiatrists, still see homosexuality as a mental 
illness,106 there has been a significant shift away from this view. One indi-
cation of this shift was the American Psychiatric Association's 1973 deci-
sion to declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder.1°7 The effects of the 
shift from viewing homosexuality as a disease have been dramatic: some of 
the stigma associated with homosexuality has lifted and more LGB people 
have become comfortable and open about their sexual orientation. Howev-
er, the "born that way" argument, by emphasizing strong biological bases 
for homosexuality, represents a return of sorts to a disease model of homo-
sexuality. Further, the mere availability and use of orientation-selection 
104. See, e.g., Haldeman, Conversion Therapy, supra note 44; JONATHAN N. KATZ, GAY 
AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 129-406 (rev. ed. 1992); Silverstein, 
supra note 44; Haldeman, Practice and Ethics, supra note 44; Murphy, supra note 44; Siobhan Somer-
ville, Scientific Racism and the Emergence of the Homosexual Body, 5 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 243 (1994). 
105. Heino Meyer-Bahlburg, Psychoendocrine Research on Sexual Orientation: Current Status and 
Future Options, in PROGRESS IN BRAINREsEARCH 375 (G. J. Devries et al. eds. 1984). 
106. See, e.g., NICOLOSI, supra note 47; Joseph Nicolosi et al., Beliefs and Practices of Therapists 
Who Practice Sexual Reorientation Psychotherapy, 86 PSYCH. REP. 689 (2000); see also Shidlo & 
Schroeder, supra note 45, at 249; Cruz, supra note 97, at 1300. 
107. See, e.g., BAYER, supra note 90. 
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procedures could suggest that screening for homosexuality is a reasonable 
and sanctioned medical procedure. This too could contribute towards a 
return to seeing homosexuality as a physical or mental disorder. 
Appeals to the innateness of sexual orientations potentially encourage 
interventions to prevent the development of homosexuality through orienta-
tion-selection procedures. The availability and use of orientation-selection 
procedures poses a threat to LGB people in societies that are generally 
unfriendly to them and in which most people have a preference for hetero-
sexual children. 
In this Part, I have argued that there are significant ethical, pragmatic, 
and bioethical problems with arguments from etiology for LGB rights. 
With these problems in mind, I turn to the legal context in which these 
arguments are supposed to have traction. 
Ill. LEGAL CONTEXT 
After the immutability factor first emerged in the Supreme Court's 
equal protection jurisprudence, 108 the Court has sometimes included immu-
tability as among the factors it considers in determining whether to apply 
heightened scrutiny.1 09 However, the Court does not always talk about 
immutability when it is determining the level of scrutiny a classification 
deserves.no Writing in 1980, John Hart Ely argued that the attempt to ar-
ticulate criteria for distinguishing suspect from non-suspect classifications 
had failed "at the level of theory"111 and criticized the suggestion that "the 
immutability of the classifying trait ought to make the classification sus-
pect. "112 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,113 which involved 
a group home for "mentally retarded" people, the Supreme Court agreed 
with Ely that immutability is not a central factor in determining whether a 
law that makes use of a classification should receive heightened scrutiny. 
Quoting Ely in support of its conclusion that the classification involved 
I 08. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71 . 
109. See Lyng v. Catillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that "close relatives are not a 'suspect' 
or 'quasi-suspect' class (because] ... they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing charac-
teristics that define them as a discrete group"); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 602-03 (1987) (quoting 
Lyng); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) ("the presumption of statutory validity may . .. be 
undermined when a State has enacted legislation creating classes based upon certain other immutable 
human attributes"). 
ll0. Mass. Bd. ofRet. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (holding that the elderly "have not 
experienced a ' history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique disabilities on the 
basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities"). 
ll I. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 149 (1980). 
112. Id. at 150. 
113. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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does not get heightened scrutiny, the Court concluded its analysis as fol-
lows: 
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed 
quasi-suspect . . . it would be difficult to find a principled way to distin-
guish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities 
setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired 
legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from 
at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only 
the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant 
to set out on that course, and we decline to do so. I l4 
Since Cleburne, the Supreme Court has rarely mentioned immutability as a 
factor in equal protection analysis. 
Insofar as immutability remains a factor in the Court's view of equal 
protection, it seems to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a 
classification being deemed suspect.115 A bodily characteristic like, for 
example, height, is mostly immutable, but height classifications do not get 
heightened scrutiny .1 16 More generally, classifications that are not related 
to political powerlessness are not deemed suspect even if they are immuta-
ble. Further, some suspect classifications are in some sense mutable. For 
example, while it is possible to change one's religion and to change-both 
legally and medically--one' s sex, 117 sex classifications and religious clas-
sifications 11 8 are still both suspect. I I 9 
114. Id. at 445-46. 
I 15 . See, e.g., Spitko, supra note 71, at 598 (arguing that "immutability ofa characteristic is neither 
a prerequisite to nor a sufficient condition for heightened scrutiny of a classification relating to that 
characteristic"); Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 
89 YALE L. J. 1063, 1073 (1980). 
116. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J. concurring and dissenting). 
117. See, e.g., Julie Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories: A Comparison of 
Multiracial and Transgendered Experiences, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (2002). But see, e.g., Littleton 
v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 1999) (holding a person's sex is fixed at birth). 
118. Religious classifications are suspect but in light of the First Amendment's guarantee of free 
exercise of religion, see U.S. CONST. amend. I, not the Fourteenth Amendment. The California Supreme 
Court, for example, used the analogy to religion to show that immutability is not a requirement for 
being a suspect classification. Ma"iage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, at 442 ("[A] person's religion is a suspect 
classification for equal protection pwposes and one's religion, of course, is not immutable but is a 
matter over which an individual has control."). 
I 19. Some legal scholars have argued that the Court has effectively dispensed with--0r at least de-
emphasized--the three-tiered framework for assessing whether laws violate equal protection. See, e.g., 
Goldberg, supra note 67; Samuel Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646,665 
(2001) (discussing "the Court's gradual abandonment of the once-rigid framework of equal protection 
analysis, with its levels of scrutiny serving as an almost perfect predictor of outcomes"); Cass Sunstein, 
The Supreme Court 1995 Term; Foreward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 77 
( 1996) ("The hard edges of the tripartite division have thus softened, and there has been at least a 
modest convergence away from tiers and towards general balancing of relevant interests."). Their 
argument is based, in part, on the fact that sometimes rational review is applied in a non-deferential 
manner (sometimes known as "rational review with bite", see supra note 66), the indeterminacy of the 
intermediate scrutiny standard, and, perhaps, the indeterminacy of the strict scrutiny standard. Even if 
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Regarding sexual orientation in particular, the Supreme Court has not 
directly ruled on the question of whether sexual-orientation classifications 
warrant heightened scrutiny and has steered clear of immutability when it 
has dealt with LGB rights cases. In Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, 
and Windsor v. United States, all cases in which immutability arguments 
were presented, the Court held in favor of LGB litigants but without ad-
dressing the question of whether sexual-orientation classifications are sus-
pect and thus without considering the immutability of sexual orientation. In 
Romer v. Evans, the Court held unconstitutional an amendment to Colora-
do's constitution120 that precluded state and local action protecting homo-
sexual and bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, and relationships.121 
The Supreme Court found the Colorado amendment unconstitutional with-
out invoking heightened scrutiny because the classification at issue did not 
satisfy the rational review test.122 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court 
held that a Texas law prohibiting sodomy between persons of the same 
sex123 was unconstitutional.124 Of the six judges who held that the Texas 
sodomy law was unconstitutional, only Justice O'Connor held that it vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause. In reaching this conclusion, O'Connor 
did not apply heightened scrutiny, but rather applied a "more searching 
form of rational ... review."125 Justice Kennedy, writing for the five-
justice majority, found the Texas sodomy law unconstitutional on grounds 
that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 126 
thus, like O'Connor's concurrence, the majority did not reach the question 
of whether laws that make use of sexual-orientation classifications are sus-
pect. Finally, in Windsor v. United States, 127 Justice Kennedy, writing for a 
five-justice majority, struck down the portion of DOMA that defined mar-
riage for purposes of federal law so as to exclude same-sex couples from 
having their marriages recognized by the federal government, without 
the three-tiered approach has been-or is on its way to being-abolished or if it is beginning to atrophy, 
immutability may remain a factor in assessing whether a law satisfies equal protection, see, e.g., Mar-
cosson, supra note 119, at 669, but its role in this non-tiered legal terrain is even less certain than under 
the standard three-tiered framework. Even assuming the continued vitality of the three-tiered approach 
to equal protection, the role of immutability in determining the level of scrutiny to which a law is 
subject remains uncertain. 
120. COLO. CONST. art. II,§ 30b. 
121. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
122. Id. at 632 ("[T]he sheer breadth [of the Colorado amendment] is so discontinuous with the 
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it 
affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests."). 
123. TEX. 2003 PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003). 
124. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
125. Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
126. Id. at 578. 
127. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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reaching the question of suspect classification.128 As in Romer, Kennedy 
found that the provision in question failed to satisfy the standard of review 
appropriate to laws based on animus.129 
Although the Supreme Court has rarely mentioned immutability since 
Cleburne, lower federal courts and state supreme courts have continued to 
talk about immutability in the context of laws related to sexual orientation. 
Of these courts, some have rejected the claim that sexual orientations are 
immutable and, thereby, failed to apply heightened scrutiny to laws that 
make use of sexual orientation on that basis. 
In 1987, Joseph Steffan, a midshipman, was forced to resign from the 
Navy because of his sexual orientation. Steffan challenged the policy under 
which he was forced to resign, citing equal protection grounds, and argued, 
in part, that the policy should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because 
sexual orientations are immutable. 130 In support of his argument, Steffan 
filed affidavits from Richard Green, a lawyer and psychiatrist who argued 
that homosexuality was immutable.131 The trial judge held that 
[H]omosexual orientation is neither conclusively mutable nor immutable 
since the scientific community is still quite at sea on the causes of homo-
sexuality, its permanence, its prevalence, and its definition .... [W]ithout 
a definitive answer at hand, yet confident that some people exercise 
some choice in their own sexual orientation, the Court does not regard 
homosexuality as being an immutable characteristic.132 
On appeal, this ruling was reversed when a three-judge panel applied 
rational review and, under this weak standard, found the Navy's policy to 
be unconstitutional, thereby leaving unanswered whether sexual-orientation 
classifications are suspect_I33 However, the trial court's decision was even-
tually affirmed by an en bane panel of the appellate court, which agreed 
rational review was the appropriate standard of review, but disagreed with 
the original three-judge panel's application of the standard and upheld the 
Navy's policy, rejecting the idea that sexual-orientation classifications 
deserve heightened scrutiny. 134 In effect, the en bane panel in Steffan said 
that sexual-orientation classifications do not warrant suspect status because 
128. But see Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(finding that the Supreme Court in Windsor actually applied heightened scrutiny to laws that make use 
of sexual-orientation classifications). 
129. Id. at 2693. 
130. GAYS AND THE MILITARY: JOSEPH STEFFAN VERSUS THE UNITED STATES 17 (Marc Wolinsky 
& Kenneth Sherrill eds. 1993) (reprinting memorandum of law in support of Steffan's motion for 
summary judgment in Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991)). 
131. Id. at 56, 171 (affidavits of Richard Green). 
132. Steffan, 780 F. Supp. at 6 & n.15. 
133. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
134. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
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sexual orientation, unlike race, gender, and ethnicity, is a behavioral classi-
fication rather than a status-based classifications. The en bane panel in 
Steffan, in reaching that result, relied on Bowers v. Hardwick, 135 a Supreme 
Court case that is no longer good law.136 Some opponents of LGB rights 
have, however, argued that this distinction between status-based and behav-
ior-based classification as used in Steffan survives.137 
The trial judge in Romer v. Evans responded to immutability argu-
ments in a fashion similar to the Steffan trial judge. The lawyers for the 
plaintiffs challenging Colorado's anti-LGB rights amendment called vari-
ous witnesses to testify that sexual orientations were immutable, including 
Richard Green, scientist Dean Hamer, and Judd Marmor, a psychiatrist and 
former Vice President of the American Psychiatric Association. 138 Alt-
hough the trial judge found the Colorado amendment unconstitutional, 139 
he rejected the argument that sexual-orientation classifications warrant 
heightened scrutiny based, in part, on the following analysis of the testimo-
ny on immutability: 
[W]itnesses addressed the question of whether homosexuality is in-
born ... or a choice based on life experiences ... . Plaintiffs strongly ar-
gue that homosexuality is inborn. All the suspect and quasi-suspect 
classes, race, alienage, national origin, gender and illegitimacy, are in-
born. Defendants argue that homosexuality or bisexuality is either a 
choice, or its origin has multiple aspects or its origin is unknown. The 
preponderance of credible evidence suggests that there is a biologic or 
genetic "component" of sexual orientation, but even Dr. Hamer, the wit-
ness who testified that he is 99.5% sure there is some genetic influence in 
forming sexual orientation, admits that sexual orientation is not com-
pletely genetic. The ultimate decision on "nature" vs. "nurture" is a deci-
sion for another forum, not this court, and the court makes no 
determination on [it].140 
The defendants appealed the trial court's ruling that the amendment 
was unconstitutional, but the plaintiffs did not appeal the trial court's find-
135. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
136. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today . . .. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled."). 
137. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives, who 
defended DOMA in United Stated v. Windsor, argued that sexual orientation are behavioral-based 
classifications and thus not immutable. Brief on the Merits for Respondent The Bipartisan Legal Advi-
sory Group of the United States House of Representatives, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013) (Nos. 12-307), at 55. 
138. LISA KEEN & SUZANNE GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 43-73 
(1998) (discussing the testimony in support of the immutability of sexual orientation). 
139. Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at •9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1993) (finding the 
law violated "the fundamental right of an identifiable group to participate in the political process with-
out being supported by a compelling state interest."). 
140. Id. at •11. 
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ing that sexual orientations do not warrant heightened scrutiny. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision,141 but without ad-
dressing the equal protection issues. 142 Ultimately, as discussed above, the 
U.S Supreme Court also found the Colorado amendment unconstitutional, 
albeit on different grounds. I43 
The trial courts in Steffan and Romer and the en bane appellate court 
in Steffan together cover the major reasons that courts have given for re-
•jecting immutability arguments in favor of treating sexual orientations as 
suspect classifications. First, some courts have said that sexual-orientation 
classifications are behavior-based classifications, not status-based classifi-
cations, and that behavior-based classifications cannot be immutable.144 
Second, courts have said that sexual orientations are not immutable because 
some people can change, choose, or hide their sexual orientations. 145 Third, 
courts have said that it is simply not yet known whether or not sexual ori-
entations are immutable.146 
At least one trial court that considered immutability found that sexual 
orientations are immutable for reasons rejected by the trial courts in Steffan 
and Romer. In Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cin-
cinnati, the trial judge accepted as a finding of fact that "(s]exual orienta-
tion is set in at a very earlier age-3 to 5 years-and is not only 
141. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo.1994). 
142. Id. at 1341 n.3. 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 120-121. 
144. In addition to the en bane panel in Steffan, see, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. 
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[H]omosexuality is not an immutable characteris-
tic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage."); 
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[M]embers of recognized suspect 
or quasi-suspect classes, e.g. blacks or women, exhibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexu-
ality is primarily behavioral in character."). .. 
145. In addition to the trial court in Steffan, see, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. Cin-
cinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding sexual-orientation classifications not suspect because LGB 
people do not "comprise an identifiable class," in part because "many homosexuals successfully con-
ceal their orientation") vacated by 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), reinstated on reh'g 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 
1997); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (sexual-orientation classifications not suspect 
because "(i]t would be quite anomalous ... to declare status defined by conduct that states may consti-
tutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause."); Opinion of the 
Justices, 525 A.2d 1095 (N.H. 1987) ("For purposes of federal equal protection analysis, homosexuals 
do not constitute a suspect class . . . as sexual preference is not a matter necessarily tied to gender, but 
rather to inclination, whatever the source thereof."). 
146. In addition to the trial court in Romer, see, e.g., Andersen v. Kings Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 974 
(Wash. 2006) ("To qualify as a suspect class for purposes of an equal protection analysis, . .. the char-
acteristic defining the class [must be) an obvious, immutable trait. . . . [P]laintiffs must make a showing 
[that 'homosexuality is an immutable characteristic' ] and they have not."); Conaway v. Deane, 932 
A.2d 571 , 6 I 5, n.57 (Md. 2007) ("[N]o studies currently available to the public have been subjected to 
rigorous analysis under the Frye-Reed standard in order to determine the scientific reliability of the 
methodology, principles, and resultant conclusion of the foregoing studies for the purposes of eviden-
tiary admissibility."). 
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involuntary, but is unamenable to change."147 The court went on to hold 
that sexual-orientation classifications warrant heightened scrutiny in part 
because "sexual orientation is a characteristic ... beyond the control of the 
individual [and] unamendable to techniques to change it."148 This court 
accepted the most straightforward application of immutability as entailing 
heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation. 
Other courts that have found that laws that invoke sexual-orientation 
classifications warrant heightened scrutiny have done so by either expand-
ing the definition of immutability or by looking at other considerations 
instead of immutability. One early case that looked beyond immutability 
was Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 971 P.2d 435 (Ore. 
App. 1998). In Tanner, three lesbian employees sued OHSU, claiming the 
university's refusal to give them domestic partner benefits violated the state 
constitution. The court did not require that sexual orientations be immuta-
ble to reach the conclusion that sexual-orientation classifications warrant 
heightened scrutiny: 
[I]mmutability-in the sense of inability to alter or change-is not nec-
essary. . . . [A]lienage and religious affiliation . . . are suspect clas-
ses ... [and b]oth ... may be changed almost at will. For that matter, 
given modem medical technology, so also may gender. We therefore un-
derstand from the cases that the focus of suspect class definition is not 
necessarily the immutability of the common, class-defining characteris-
tics, but instead the fact that such characteristics are historically regarded 
as defining distinct, socially-recognized groups that have been the sub-
ject of adverse social or political stereotyping or prejudice.149 
This approach-finding immutability is not necessary to hold that sexual-
orientation classifications are suspect or quasi-suspect-was most recently 
embraced by the Second Circuit in Windsor when it struck down DOMA 
on equal protection grounds, although in a manner different than the way 
the Supreme Court eventually struck down DOMA.150 
147. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 426 (S.D. Ohio 1994) 
rev 'd 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), reinstated on reh 'g 128 F.3d 289 (6th 
Cir. 1997). 
148. Id. at 437. 
149. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 446. Instead of focusing on immutability, the court found that OHSU 
violated OR. CONST, ART. I § 20, which says, "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of 
citizens privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." 
Id. at 448. 
150. Compare Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d. Cir. 2012) (Although "often couched in 
terms of ' immutability' . .. the test [for heightened scrutiny] is broader: whether there are 'obvious, 
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define ... a discrete group.' Classifications based on 
alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin are all subject to heightened scrutiny, even though these 
characteristics do not declare themselves, and often may be disclosed or suppressed as a matter of 
preference.") with Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). See supra text accompanying notes 127-129. 
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Finally, other courts have reached the finding that laws that make use 
of sexual-orientation classifications warrant heightened scrutiny by articu-
lating an alternative definition of immutability, namely, by saying that a 
trait is immutable if changing it is very difficult or if the trait is so im-
portant to a person's identity that it is deeply problematic for the govern-
ment to force a person to change that trait. 151 I call this alternative defini-
definition of immutability "soft" immutability. The Connecticut Supreme 
Court, for example, in a case concerning the constitutionality of providing 
relationship recognition to same-sex couples through a civil union scheme 
rather than through marriage, held that sexual orientation was a suspect 
classification "[b ]ecause sexual orientation is such an essential component 
of personhood, even if there is some possibility that a person's sexual pref-
erence can be altered, it would be wholly unacceptable for the state to re-
quire anyone to do so."152 The court held that the immutability factor was 
satisfied because LGB people "[a]re characterized by a 'central, defining 
[trait] ofpersonhood, which may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of 
significant damage to the individual's sense of self. "'153 Similarly, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in a case concerning the constitutionality of Califor-
nia's prohibition on marriage between two people of the same sex, held that 
sexual-orientation classifications warrant strict scrutiny, reasoning as fol-
lows: "Because a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of 
one's identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or 
change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treat-
ment. "154 Other courts have similarly found sexual orientations to be sus-
pect by construing immutability as soft immutability.155 
To review, some courts have continued to focus on "standard" (that is, 
not soft) immutability in determining whether sexual orientation is a sus-
pect classification-some find that sexual orientations are not immutable 
and thus that laws that make use of sexual-orientation classifications do not 
deserve heightened scrutiny, while others find sexual orientations are im-
mutable and that laws that make use of sexual-orientations do warrant 
151. Marcosson, supra note 119, at 652, tries to resuscitate the immutability argument by defining 
immutability as "[t]he condition of a characteristic or trait such that it is or is experienced as(!) either 
unalterable by a voluntary act of will by the individual; or alterable only with substantial cost or diffi-
culty to the individual, and (2) not having been acquired through the voluntary choice of the individu-
al." 
152. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,432 (Conn. 2008). 
153. Id. at 438-39. 
154. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,442 (Cal. 2008). 
155. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988) (defining a trait 
as immutable if "changing it would involve great physical difficulty" or if it is "so central to a person's 
identity that it would be abhorrent for the government to penalize a person for refusing to change") 
vacated and affd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane). 
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heightened scrutiny. Courts have reached the conclusion that laws that 
make use of sexual-orientation classifications warrant heightened scrutiny 
in two other ways: either by sidestepping immutability or by broadening 
what counts as immutable. The courts that sidestep immutability are not 
especially interesting for purposes of this paper, but the other approaches 
are. The courts that focus on "standard" immutability agree on the rele-
vance of immutability, but disagree about whether it has been established 
that sexual orientation is immutable; in other words, they disagree about a 
scientific question. I now turn my attention to the remaining approach, 
which embraces soft immutability. 
From the point of view of advocates of LGB rights, the main virtue of 
soft immutability is the relative ease of establishing sexual orientations are 
immutable in the "soft" sense compared to establishing they are immutable 
in the "standard" sense. Changing one's sexual orientation is difficult.1 56 
Even adherents of "conversion" therapy, who think that sexual orientations 
are, for some people, changeable, admit that such change is hard.157 The 
challenge for advocates of LGB rights who wish to make use of immutabil-
ity is to convince courts to focus on soft immutability rather than standard 
immutability, in other words, to convince courts to focus on whether sexual 
orientations are difficult to change or distinctly central to one's identity 
instead of focusing on whether sexual orientations are innate or unchange-
able. Most, if not all, courts that have framed the question of whether sexu-
al orientations are immutable in the "soft" sense have answered ''yes." 158 
However, this approach faces some problems. 
The first problem is interpretative. When the Supreme Court discussed 
immutability in the context of equal protection jurisprudence, it clearly was 
not talking about "soft" immutability. In Frontiero, the Supreme Court case 
that introduced immutability as a factor in heightened scrutiny analysis, 159 
the Court effectively defined immutability as "a characteristic determined 
solely by the accident of birth."160 On its face, this definition is incompati-
ble with "soft" immutability.I6I 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 41-53. 
157. See, e.g.,Bessen,supranote II. 
158. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Cornrn'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008); Watkins, 847 
F.2d at 1329; Ma"iage Cases, 183 P.3d 442. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71 . 
160. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686 (1973). 
161. The Tanner court, however, indirectly responded to this reading of Frontiero, in essence 
suggesting that Frontiero was consistent with a "soft" account of immutability by pointing out that this 
case was about sex classifications and that a person's sex is changeable through surgery. Tanner v. 
Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. App. 1998); see also Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1347. 
While the Supreme Court in Fronterio was certainly not thinking about sex change operations when it 
said the sex was immutable, it does not seem incompatible with the logic of the Court's analysis in 
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The second problem is that some characteristics that are immutable in 
the "soft" sense of the term do not warrant heightened scrutiny. For exam-
ple, having a disposition for alcoholism or being sexually attracted to chil-
dren are characteristics that might be "softly" immutable, but such 
characteristics do not, on any account, warrant heightened scrutiny. Thus, 
granting that sexual orientation is "softly" immutable would not seem to 
entail that sexual-orientation classifications warrant heightened scrutiny. If 
this is right, then the move from standard immutability to "soft" immutabil-
ity does not deliver heightened scrutiny for sexual-orientation classifica-
tions. 
The third problem for "soft" immutability, which relates to the two 
prior problems, is that this sense of immutability is very broad and does not 
fit at all with the standard usage of the concept of immutability. According 
to the "soft" definition of immutability, a person's religious affiliation is 
immutable even though a person's religious affiliation can be the result of a 
conscious, voluntary choice and even though it can be changed at will. 162 
This "soft" sense of immutability is just not immutability in the standard 
sense of the term, which means something like unchangeable. To put the 
point another way, while few would disagree that the state should not try to 
change a person's religious affiliation, it seems too great of a definitional 
stretch to say that religious affiliations are immutable; surely, this is a char-
acteristic that in a religiously free and pluralistic society the state should 
not attempt to change, but it is definitely possible for a person's religious 
affiliation to change. 
For advocates of LGB rights, a more promising path is to deny that 
immutability is a necessary condition for heightened scrutiny. However, if 
a court insists that immutability is a necessary factor for treating sexual-
orientation classifications as suspect, as did the highest courts in Maryland 
and Washington in their marriage equality cases,163 the move to soft immu-
tability may be helpful since it is much easier to establish that sexual orien-
tations are immutable in the "soft" sense than in the standard sense. 
Fronterio to allow that characteristics that can only be changed through dramatic surgical or other 
serious physical interventions could still count as immutable. Some courts have held that a person• s sex 
is immutable, reasoning that a person's sex at birth is his or her sex for life. See, e.g., In re Estate of 
Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223,231 (Tex. 1999). 
162. See, e.g., Tanner, 971 P.2d at 446; Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442. 
163. Andersen v. Kings Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 
616 (Md. 2007). 
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D. Summary 
Some courts, when faced with the question of whether sexual-
orientation classifications warrant heightened scrutiny, have ducked the 
question by finding that the provision that makes use of such classification 
fails under the weaker test of rational basis review. Those courts that do not 
take this approach have to tackle the question of heightened scrutiny. This 
leads to a doctrinal question about immutability (is immutability a neces-
sary condition for a classification to warrant suspect status?), a definitional 
question ( can immutability be defined in the "soft" manner), and a scien-
tific question (are sexual orientations immutable?). The fate of the argu-
ment from etiology in the legal context hangs on the answer to these three 
questions. 
IV. Two OPPOSING AMICUS BRIEFS 
I turn now to two amicus briefs from the Windsor and Perry cases in 
the Supreme Court's 2013 term. Both briefs, one in support of the legal 
recognition of same-sex marriages and the other opposed to such recogni-
tion, discuss immutability in greater detail than any of the over one hundred 
briefs filed in these two cases.164 My aim is to use the preceding discussion 
as a lens for examining these briefs and a path to evaluating both the wis-
dom and efficacy of the arguments from etiology for LGB rights, generally, 
and in the legal context, more specifically. 
I begin with the brief of Dr. Paul McHugh, a professor of psychiatry 
who, according to the statement of interest in the amicus brief, has scholar-
ly expertise in gender identity and sexual orientation issues.165 In relevant 
part, the reasoning of the brief is as follows: immutability is a necessary 
condition for sexual orientation to qualify as a suspect class entitled to 
heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause (a doctrinal claim);I66 
164. The parties and the court-appointed amicus in Perry and Windsor together submitted 27 briefs. 
See Filings in the Filings in the Defense of Marriage Act and California's Proposition 8 Cases, 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/domprp8.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2014). There were 96 amicus briefs in Perry at the merits stage while there were 80 such 
briefs in Windsor. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, It Was Another Big Tenn for Amicus Curiae Briefs at the 
High Court, ABA J., Sept. I , 2013, available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/art 
icle/it_was_another_big_term_for_amicus_curiae_briefs_at_the_high_court/. Many of these amicus 
briefs, like the McHugh Brief and the GLMA Brief, were submitted in both Windsor and Perry. (Full 
disclosure requires me to say that I was one of the amici who submitted a brief in Perry. Brief of Amici 
Curiae Edward Stein, Joanna Grossman, Kerry Abrams, Holning Lau, Katharine Silbaugh and 32 Other 
Professors of Family Law and Constitutional Law in Support of Respondents, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144)). 
I 65. McHugh Brief, supra note I 8, at I. 
166. Id. at 15. 
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the relevant definition of immutability is "determined solely by accident of 
birth" (a definitional claim, with doctrinal implications);167 scientific evi-
dence demonstrates that sexual orientation is not immutable (a scientific 
claim); and, therefore, sexual orientation should not be deemed a suspect 
classification.168 Regarding the scientific evidence, the brief describes its 
thesis as the "modest" claim that we do not know enough "[ a ]bout what 
sexual orientation is, what causes it, and why and how it sometimes chang-
es"I69 to undergird the claim that sexual orientations are immutable. Spe-
cifically, the McHugh brief claims that sexual orientation is "[i]nfluenced 
by a variety of factors beyond genetics and biology,"17° as supported by the 
fact that "[t]here is not 100% concordance among identical twins" with 
respect to sexual orientation. The brief also claims that sexual orientations 
are fluid and can change over time, noting the existence of a large number 
of bisexuals171 and studies of women's sexual orientation. 172 In light of 
what we know and do not know about sexual orientation, the McHugh brief 
argues that it would be a mistake to treat laws that make use of sexual-
orientation classifications as warranting heightened scrutiny .173 
The GMLA brief is partly a response to the McHugh brief, but it also 
makes a positive argument that sexual orientation warrants heightened 
scrutiny, in part because sexual orientations are innate and immutable. The 
GMLA brief begins with the doctrinal claim that immutability is not a nec-
essary condition for a characteristic warranting heightened scrutinyl74 and 
the definitional claim (with doctrinal import) that immutability does not 
necessarily mean "accident ofbirth."175 The GMLA brief, like the McHugh 
brief, points to genetic and biological research 176 when it discusses two 
scientific claims, namely most people view their own sexual orientation as 
innate177 and changing one's sexual orientation is difficult. 178 
167. Id. (citing Frontiero , 411 U.S. at 686; and Quiban v. Veterans Admin., 928 F.2d I 154, I 160 
n.13 (D.C. Cir. 199 I)). 
I 68. Id. at 15-28. 
169. Id. at 3. 
170. Id. at 18. 
171. Id. at 21. 
172. Id. at21 , 24. 
173. Id. at 28-29. 
174. GLMA Brief, supra note 17, at 4. 
175. Id. at 5 n.3. 
176. Id. at 12-26 (discussing, inter alia, the work of Bailey & Pillard, supra note 25; Hamer, et al. , 
supra note 26; Le Vay, supra note 20). 
177. Id. at 26-27. 
178. Id. at 27-3 I. 
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There are various claims in each of these briefs that are supported by 
the discussion in the preceding Parts of this Article. 179 Based on this, I 
suggest a way of thinking about immutability that combines some of what 
is right in each. Some of the scientific claims in the McHugh brief are well 
supported, namely that the development of sexual orientation is complicat-
ed and influenced by many factors,180 that sexual orientation is more fluid 
than commonly assumed,181 that there is no convincing evidence that sexu-
al orientation is biologically determined, and that there is a great deal that 
we do not know about how sexual orientations develop.182 The GMLA 
brief is, however, right about an especially important scientific claim, that a 
person cannot consciously change his/her sexual orientation. 183 Further, the 
GMLA brief is right-and the McHugh brief is wrong-about an important 
legal thesis, namely that immutability is not required to establish height-
ened scrutiny .184 
In light of this discussion of these two briefs and the analysis of this 
Article, advocates of LGB rights should focus on scientific claims that are 
well supported. One such significant claim is that sexual orientations are 
not consciously chosen. While the GLMA Brief makes this claim, it is easi-
ly lost among the various other scientific claims the brief makes about sex-
ual orientation, some of them dubious. In the development of this claim, it 
important to note that, contra the McHugh Brief,185 the position that sexual 
orientations are not consciously chosen is consistent with the fact that bi-
sexuals can chose between male and female sexual and life partners; as 
Cynthia Nixon suggested,186 one does not chose to have a bisexual sexual 
orientation any more than one choses to have "monosexual" orientation 
(that is, gay or heterosexual). Another related significant and well-
supported claim is that sexual orientations, although they may change over 
a lifespan, cannot be consciously controlled, and virtually all efforts to 
change sexual orientation are destined to failure, a point ignored by the 
McHugh Brief. 187 As a helpful analogy, note that hair color, dyeing aside, 
179. There are also claims in both briefs, especially the McHugh brief, that are problematic. I do 
not here enumerate all of these problematic claims, but I do note some of them. 
180. McHugh Brief, supra note 18, at 3. 
181. Id. at 20-28. 
182. Id. at 14-19; see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
183. GLMA Brief, supra note 17, at 13 ("No peer-reviewed published scientific studies support the 
hypothes[i]s that ... sexual orientation is chosen."); supra text accompanying notes 39-40. 
184. Compare GLMA Brief, supra note 17, at 4-8, and supra text accompanying notes 115-119, 
with McHugh Brief, supra note 18, at 15. 
185. McHugh Brief, supra note 18, at 25-27. 
186. Grindley, supra, note 10 ("[B]isexuality is not a choice ... [w]hat I have chosen is to be in a 
gay relationship."). 
187. McHugh Brief, supra note 18, at 27. 
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can change from blond to brown to gray to white (for example) over a life-
time, but hair color is still immutable and not subject to conscious change. 
In contrast, there are risks with putting claims about the innateness of sexu-
al orientation at the center of a legal argument, especially because these 
claims have weaker scientific support and judges may have difficulty di-
gesting the evidence that might support such claims.188 This shows that the 
"not a choice" argument has stronger scientific premises than the "born that 
way" argument, and advocates of LOB rights should recognize this and 
structure their legal arguments accordingly. 
In terms of legal doctrine, advocates of LOB rights should emphasize, 
as the OLMA Brief does, that immutability (at least in the standard defini-
tion) is not a necessary condition. The precedent for this is strong; the Sec-
ond Circuit recently noted that immutability is just one of three options for 
satisfying one of the factors relevant to suspect ( or quasi-suspect) status-
that is "whether the class exhibits 'obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
characteristics that define them as a discrete group. "'189 Further support for 
this claim can be drawn from the fact that not all suspect classifications are 
immutable in the standard sense. Discussing citizenship status, illegitimacy, 
religious affiliations, and sex may be helpful.190 
One additional problem with etiological arguments for LOB rights and 
the use of immutability in the legal context is worth noting. There is an 
expressive function to making legal arguments.191 When one gives an ac-
count of why the use of a classification violates equal protection, part of 
what one is doing is giving an account of why it is wrong to make use of 
such classifications in the law. Advocates of LOB rights want to say that it 
is wrong to make use of sexual-orientation classifications in the law, 
whether or not sexual orientations are immutable ( or even immutable in the 
"soft" sense). Just as focusing on whether a characteristic is inborn or cho-
sen is beside the point generally, focusing on immutability should be beside 
the point legally. 
188. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 138-140. 
189. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d. Cir. 2012) (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 
U.S. 587 (1987)). 
190. In addition to text accompanying supra notes 117-119, see Watkins v. United States Army, 
847 F.2d 1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988) ("People can have operations to change their sex. Aliens can 
ordinarily become naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate children can be changed. People can 
frequently hide their national origin by changing their customs, their names, or their associations. 
Lighter skinned blacks can sometimes 'pass' for white, as can Latinos for Anglos, and some people can 
even change their racial appearance with pigment injections."). 
191. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, The Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV 2021, 2021-25, 
2023 n.10 ( 1996). 
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A final pragmatic point is in order. Sometimes circumstances may 
force a litigator to address immutability as a factor in arguing that sexual-
orientation classifications warrant heightened scrutiny. For example, imag-
ine trying to argue that sexual-orientation classifications deserve height-
ened scrutiny in a state court in Washington, in light of the its highest court 
having said that "[t]o qualify as a suspect class ... the characteristic defin-
ing the class [must be] ... immutable."192 In this context, it would be hard 
for an advocate for LBG rights to avoid addressing immutability. One 
might try to argue that this statement was dicta, but perhaps, in this context, 
a more promising strategy would be to try to shift the focus to soft immuta-
bility. 
CONCLUSION 
At the start of this essay, I presented two examples, supplemented by 
some related thoughts, about intra-group dissent regarding arguments for 
etiology about LGB rights. Bill Richardson and Cynthia Nixon got into 
trouble for suggesting that sexual orientation is not biological and that 
choice might play a role in the development of sexual orientations. Their 
comments rankled, in part, because many advocates of LGB rights accept 
that claims about how sexual orientation develop are legally and ethically 
important. While Part II showed that there are a variety of ethical and 
pragmatic problems with connecting scientific claims about the etiology of 
sexual orientation and LGB rights, Part III suggested that, although there 
are some problems with doing so, there may also be some legal benefits to 
be gained from trying to make such connections. Part IV suggested that this 
would best be done in a nuanced manner, and indicated more specifically 
what legal and scientific claims would be best emphasized by advocates of 
LGB rights. 
192. Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006). 
